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Today, information is shared almost constantly. People share their DNA to track
their ancestry or for individualized health information; they instruct Alexa to purchase
products or provide directions; and, now more than ever, they use videoconferencing
technology in their homes. According to the third-party doctrine, the government can
access all such information without a warrant or without infringing on Fourth
Amendment privacy protections. This exposure of vast amounts of highly personal data
to government intrusion is permissible because the Supreme Court has interpreted the
third-party doctrine as a per se rule. However, that interpretation rests on an improper
understanding of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard developed in Katz v.
United States.
There is a solution. A close reading of Katz’s logic can reorient third-party
analysis from a per se rule to a tailored test of the knowledge of the sharer and the
nature of the recipient, asking whether the sharer (1) knowingly exposed information
(2) to the public. This interpretation allows the Fourth Amendment to better evolve
with changing technology, such that the exception no longer risks swallowing the rule.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court Justices seem to take a bashful pride in their
struggles with technology: Justice Breyer jokes that he does not know
how to open his iPhone; 1 Justice Kagan reports that most of the Justices
do not understand Facebook or Twitter and do not use email; 2 and
while the rest of the world was moving to videoconferencing in the face
of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court opted for the
“antiquated technology of the telephone” 3—and still multiple Justices
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, United States v. Wurie, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)
(No. 13-212):
MR. DREEBEN: So if you have an iPhone, Justice Breyer, and I don’t know what
kind of phone that you have—
JUSTICE BREYER: I don’t either because I can never get into it because of the
password. [Laughter.]
2 Jason Leopold, The US Supreme Court Uses Email After All—Or at Least Two Justices Do,
VICE (July 11, 2016) https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qv5ad3/the-us-supreme-courtuses-email-after-all-or-at-least-two-justices-do
[https://perma.cc/TQ3P-B63R]
(“They
didn’t really understand Facebook and Twitter, she said, and . . . ‘[t]he court hasn’t really
“gotten to” email,’ . . . because the justices are old, they had a difficult time grasping new
technology.”).
3 Tonja Jacobi, Timothy R. Johnson, Eve M. Ringsmuth & Matthew Sag, Oral
Argument in the Time of COVID: The Chief Plays Calvinball, 30 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J.
399, 400 (2021).
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struggled. 4 And yet, the Supreme Court must decide issues that hinge
on rapidly changing technology, including cases with great import for
privacy rights. 5 The most significant of these issues is the third-party
doctrine, for that doctrine has the potential to annihilate the privacy
rights of individuals engaged in a variety of everyday behaviors, from
checking email to browsing a website, merely because doing so involves
an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or some other third party.
The third-party doctrine holds that when an individual voluntarily
hands information over to a third party, that person cannot then claim
to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. 6 Back
in 1976, the third-party doctrine enabled the government to access a
“pen register”—the list of numbers dialed from a phone. 7 But the
advent of new technology has enabled the government, via the thirdparty doctrine, to engage in mass surveillance of individuals without
any recourse to the Fourth Amendment. 8 Today, individuals share
information constantly: every email is transmitted through a thirdparty email platform such as Google as well as an Internet provider;
banking is done through a third-party bank; text messages are sent
through a third-party cell phone provider; smart technology like Alexa

4 For instance, Justice Sotomayor struggled to get back on mic in the first two oral
arguments heard by telephone—Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, U.S. Pat. & Trademark
Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020) (No. 19-46); Transcript of Oral Argument
at 21, Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2082 (2020) (No. 19177)—as did Justice Alito in another case—Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (No. 18-9526). There was also the notorious failure of
someone to turn off their mic in one oral argument, during which a toilet could be heard
flushing. Jeremy Art (@cspanJeremy), TWITTER (May 6, 2020, 12:48 PM), https://
twitter.com/cspanJeremy/status/1258076164234579969 [https://perma.cc/5GGT-2RA7].
The sound is not recorded in the transcript, but it can be heard at timestamp 59:48 on the
recording. Oral Argument at 59:48, Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct.
2335 (2020) (No. 19-631), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-631 [https://perma.cc
/X8WL-R44H].
5 The Court must also decide new technology cases with great commercial
significance—for example, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021), is
estimated to be worth $9 billion. See Roger Parloff, Google and Oracle’s $9 Billion ‘Copyright
Case of the Decade’ Could Be Headed for the Supreme Court, NEWSWEEK (May 23, 2019), https://
www.newsweek.com/2019/06/07/google-oracle-copyright-case-supreme-court1433037.html [https://perma.cc/28SQ-4JUN].
6 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.” (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971)); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”).
7 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737, 745–46.
8 See generally Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425
(2017) (describing the history of mass surveillance, particularly of marginalized minorities).
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exists throughout modern homes. Under the third-party doctrine as it
is currently interpreted, all of these activities can be monitored by
government agents, without themselves being monitored by a neutral
judge as to whether they comply with the Fourth Amendment, because
every individual has “voluntarily” conveyed this information to a third
party. 9 The potential risks this per se standard poses to individual
privacy are multifarious and potentially constitutionally groundbreaking—in today’s information age, we bring third parties into our
homes, 10 into our cars, 11 and even into our bodies. 12
The Supreme Court, other courts, and scholars have all
recognized that there is a serious problem with the third-party
doctrine. 13 Yet, the Court has refused to provide an adequate solution.
In 2018, the Court recognized that applying a doctrine built for pen
registers to smart phones is inappropriately intrusive. 14 But rather
than tackling the underlying problem, the Court merely carved out a
narrow exemption for cell site location information (CSLI)—and only
some forms of such information at that—saying:
Cell phone location information is not truly “shared” as one
normally understands the term. In the first place, cell phones and
the services they provide are “such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life” that carrying one is indispensable to participation in
modern society. Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint
of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user
beyond powering up. Virtually any activity on the phone generates
CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails and countless
other data connections that a phone automatically makes when
checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from

9 See discussion infra Part I.
10 See Minyvonne Burke, Amazon’s Alexa May Have Witnessed Alleged Florida Murder,
Authorities Say, NBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news
/amazon-s-alexa-may-have-witnessed-alleged-florida-murder-authorities-n1075621
[https://perma.cc/5EDE-N5B8].
11 See Thomas Brewster, Cartapping: How Feds Have Spied on Connected Cars for 15 Years,
FORBES (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/15
/police-spying-on-car-conversations-location-siriusxm-gm-chevrolet-toyota-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/EN28-XK3G].
12 See Lindsey Van Ness, DNA Databases Are Boon to Police but Menace to Privacy, Critics
Say, PEW: STATELINE (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis
/blogs/stateline/2020/02/20/dna-databases-are-boon-to-police-but-menace-to-privacycritics-say [https://perma.cc/KYQ9-6GYB].
13 See infra note 33.
14 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (acknowledging the
“seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s
location but also everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years”).
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disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid
leaving behind a trail of location data. 15

All these points are true, but each also applies to multiple other
daily activities that the third-party doctrine continues to exempt from
Fourth Amendment protection. As Justice Sotomayor noted, the thirdparty doctrine leaves a similar amount of information unprotected
when individuals carry out “mundane tasks,” including when
“disclos[ing] the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books,
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.”16
Blithely ignoring the fact that these very same concerns arise with so
many other technologies leaves individuals unprotected from mass
surveillance, unhinges the third-party doctrine from its doctrinal
moorings, and leaves unaddressed future applications, including vital
information gathering measures.
In this Article, we provide a solution for the problem that the
third-party doctrine categorically exempts from any expectation of
privacy so many modern forms of communication and other ordinary
life activities. Our solution avoids creating a patchwork of exceptions,
which would undermine certainty and doctrinal coherence, but nor
does it require marching boldly into the unknown future. 17 Rather,
the solution lies simply in returning to the core principles upon which
modern search and seizure law rests: the landmark case of Katz v.
United States. 18
Katz established that government conduct constitutes a search
when it intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy; in such a
case, Fourth Amendment protection applies. 19 But a person cannot
shout their secrets from the rooftops and still claim an expectation of
privacy, and so Katz also specified that when a person knowingly
exposes information to the public, there will be no such expectation
of privacy. 20 It is from this language that the third-party doctrine is
drawn. But in two cases decided within a few years of Katz—United

15 Id. at 2220 (citation omitted) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385
(2014)).
16 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
17 These two competing concerns are discussed further in Section III.E.
18 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19 Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (laying out the dominant “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test).
20 Id. at 351 (first citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); and then
citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)) (“What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”).
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States v. Miller 21 and Smith v. Maryland 22—the Court effectively left
behind both the language and the conceptual framework underlying
this qualification, by crafting the third-party doctrine as a categorical
exception to the Katzian reasonable expectation of privacy.
Instead of inquiring, as Katz mandated, whether a person
“knowingly expose[d]” information “to the public,” Miller and Smith
subtly changed both of these requirements. First, the two decisions
changed the “knowingly” requirement to “voluntarily,” and deemed
actions to be voluntary even if a person had no option to avoid sharing
information if they wished to use a given technology. 23 So, even
though it was impossible not to share information dialed with the
telephone company in order to have a home telephone, 24 or to share
bank details with the bank teller in order to have a bank account, 25
these activities were still deemed voluntary. Second, the decisions
interpreted information as having been exposed “to the public” any
time they were shared with a third party, regardless of the
circumstances. 26 So even if Mr. Miller’s bank had promised to keep his
information secret, by sharing it with the bank itself, the Court deemed
this equivalent to sharing with the public, and thus Miller had no
expectation of privacy in his banking information. 27 Miller and Smith
created a categorical test by which any information shared under any
circumstances with any party for any reason constituted conveying
information to the public, thus losing all expectation of privacy.
This broad application of the third-party doctrine is problematic
not just in terms of being faithless to foundational precedent and
enabling mass surveillance, but it also has the potential to hamstring
the capacity of the United States government to respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic, as well as other likely future pandemics. 28 The
most effective means of combating the spread of infectious diseases is
through tracking and tracing, which itself is best operationalized
through digital means. 29 Yet, the public rightly fears making its highly
personal health data, location data, and contact information available
to the government or to third parties, 30 for the third-party doctrine
21 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
22 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
23 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43; Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45.
24 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
25 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 436.
26 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
27 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
28 See infra Conclusion.
29 See infra Conclusion.
30 See Alice Miranda Ollstein & Mohana Ravindranath, Getting It Right: States Struggle
with Contact Tracing Push, POLITICO (May 17, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020
/05/17/privacy-coronavirus-tracing-261369 [https://perma.cc/7XC7-JDDV] (“[T]he new
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renders that information, once exposed, forever subject to
government scrutiny, for any purpose, including criminal investigation. As such, finding a solution to the third-party doctrine is not
merely a question of jurisprudential coherence, but a matter of
survival, since such a solution would enable rapid responses to major
crises.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I details the creation and
development of the third-party doctrine, the function it serves, and
how it has become unmoored from its foundation in Katz. Part II
describes how dire the need is for a solution to the problem,
illustrating how invasive the third-party doctrine has become to Fourth
Amendment rights. Part III considers how to solve the problem: first,
it critically examines the various solutions considered by the Supreme
Court; then, it highlights the advantages and flaws with solutions
proposed by prior scholars; and finally, it provides our solution. This
Article concludes by explaining how the need for reform to the thirdparty doctrine has become increasingly pressing in the time of the
COVID-19 pandemic and how, without reform, the response of the
United States to this and future crises will be undermined by the
current categorical version of the third-party doctrine.
I.

MISREADING KATZ: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY
DOCTRINE

The third-party doctrine governs how and what the government
can collect from third parties in criminal investigations.31 For over four
decades, the doctrine has stood for the seemingly straightforward
concept that when a person shares something, they can no longer
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in that shared information. 32
This “you share it, you lose it” idea, while controversial, 33 was affirmed

state apps may still be viewed skeptically by a public reluctant to submit to digital tracking.
And the early experience of these states is raising questions about whether locally developed
apps will gain enough critical mass to help health officials keep tabs on the virus before new
hot spots explode.”).
31 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
32 Michael Gentithes, The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize Third-Party
Data After Carpenter, 53 GA. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2019).
33 The Court’s bright line rule has inspired passionate dissents and concurrences
articulating problems, both legal and functional. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The use of pen registers, I believe, constitutes such an
extensive intrusion. To hold otherwise ignores the vital role telephonic communication
plays in our personal and professional relationships . . . .” (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 352 (1979)); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
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as recently as 2018, albeit with at least one exception. 34 This expansive
approach to the third-party doctrine, whereby Fourth Amendment
protection is lost with any sharing to any third-party, ostensibly arises
from Katz v. United States, 35 the seminal case on whether a search or
seizure has taken place and thus whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to any government action. However, the current categorical
approach to the third-party doctrine rests on a fundamental misreading of that case’s key language. Rather than categorically excluding all
shared information from Fourth Amendment protection, the Court in
Katz articulated a fact-intensive test: “What a person knowingly exposes
to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”36
Embedded within this short phrase is a two-part test that requires a
nuanced, as-applied analysis of, first, whether information was in fact
knowingly exposed, and second, whether that exposure was made to
the public. This Part shows that subsequent cases have read down in
various ways both prongs of that test.
In addition, subsequent cases have also equated this test with the
similar, yet distinct, false-friend doctrine. In the false-friend line of
cases, the Court held that individuals have no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information shared with a confidant who then reveals it
to the government. 37 Under the third-party doctrine as articulated in
Katz, the Fourth Amendment does not cover information knowingly
exposed “to the public.” These are conceptually distinct—under the
false-friend doctrine, the information sharer takes a risk their
information will be exposed by their friend and so left unprotected,
but under the third-party doctrine, the information is unprotected
regardless of how the third party responds. 38 By both misreading the
Katz test and creating a false equivalence between the false-friend
doctrine and the third-party doctrine, the Court leaves unprotected all
information “voluntarily turn[ed] over to third parties.” 39 While this
overinclusive sharing doctrine has been somewhat cabined by modern

34 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17, 2220 (2018) (“[W]hile the
third-party doctrine applies to telephone numbers and bank records, it is not clear whether
its logic extends to the qualitatively different category of cell-site records.”).
35 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36 Id. at 351 (first citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); and then
citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
37 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966); Lewis, 385 U.S. 206; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
38 See discussion infra Section I.D.
39 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44
(1979)).
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courts, 40 the limitations are developed in an ad hoc “I know it when I
see it” standard that provides little guidance to government agents or
reviewing courts.
A. Katz and the Origin of the Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine originated with the declaration in Katz
that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” 41 To understand why this
public exposure limitation was necessary, we must delve into the Katz
case itself, for the third-party doctrine was a counterbalance to expanding what could constitute “unreasonable searches and seizures”
beyond the traditional confines of a person’s home or property and
into any area where a person has a “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”42
“Give me Duquesne minus 7 for a nickel,” Charles Katz said in a
phone call with his bookie. 43 Unbeknownst to Mr. Katz, FBI agents
were recording this conversation, and he would soon face up to two
years in prison for illegal interstate gambling. 44 The FBI had placed
recording devices on two phone booths that Katz used almost daily. 45
These recording devices could be turned on and off by nearby agents,
recorded only Katz’s side of conversations, and were taped to the
outside of the phone booths—all factors that, under traditional
analysis, indicate the recordings did not constitute searches. 46 The FBI
used these recordings to obtain a warrant to search Katz’s apartment,
where more evidence of illegal gambling was found. 47
In finding for Mr. Katz, the Supreme Court held that the
traditional property-based determination of what constitutes an illegal
search or seizure was too “narrow” and did not adequately take into

40 Id. at 2222 (holding that cell site location information, despite being held by a third
party, conveys too much information about a user’s whereabouts and cannot be shared with
the government without a warrant).
41 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (first citing Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210; and then citing Lee, 274 U.S.
at 563).
42 See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43 Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 132 (9th Cir. 1966), rev’d, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
44 Matthew Lasar, The Crooks Who Created Modern Wiretapping Law, ARS TECHNICA
(June 2, 2011), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/06/the-crooks-who-createdmodern-wiretapping-law/2/ [https://perma.cc/K7JY-TEXY].
45 Katz, 369 F.2d at 131.
46 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (noting that without “actual
physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure,” the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated).
47 Katz, 369 F.2d at 132.
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account changing technology. 48 According to the Court, as long as
there is some indicia of the existence of a subjective and objective
expectation of privacy, then “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled
to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.”49
The Court in Katz was rejecting its 1928 decision, Olmstead v.
United States, which held that placing wiretaps on public phone lines
without a warrant did not constitute an illegal search because
government agents did not infringe upon Olmstead’s property
rights. 50 In the 1920s, during the height of Prohibition, Roy Olmstead
managed a bootlegging operation in the Pacific Northwest that
employed over fifty people and earned in excess of $2,000,000 per
year. 51 The FBI, without warrants, placed wiretaps on public phone
lines and in an office building’s publicly accessible basement to
intercept phone calls between Olmstead and his team. 52 Over seventytwo people were indicted, and the recordings were used to convict
Olmstead at trial. 53 Olmstead challenged the use of the wiretaps,
claiming that recording and using private telephone conversations
violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 54 The majority held
that neither Amendment was implicated, basing the analysis in large
part on the fact that the government agents never invaded Olmstead’s
property; as Chief Justice Taft wrote for the majority, there was neither
a search nor a seizure because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or
offices of the defendants.” 55
It is important to note the dissent from Justice Brandeis, who
presciently argued that limiting the Fourth Amendment’s reach to a
property-based standard inadequately prepares the Amendment for
future challenges posed by changing surveillance technology.
Essentially, Justice Brandeis argued that although trespass may address
the use of wiretaps, “[w]ays may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
48 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[O]nce it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion . . . .”).
49 Id. at 359.
50 Olmstead, 438 U.S. at 466 (finding that the Fourth Amendment has not been
violated “unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure
of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion” which “the wire
tapping here . . . did not amount to”).
51 Id. at 456.
52 Id. at 456–57.
53 Id. at 455.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 464.
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reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to
a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.” 56 It was this
perceived limitation of the property-based model to respond to
technological advancement that led the Court in Katz, forty years later,
to make the question one of a person’s privacy expectations, rather
than formal demarcations of their property boundaries—that is, to
define Fourth Amendment protection in terms of “people, not
places.” 57
Evaluating the legality of a search based on what was gathered
rather than how it was taken represented a dramatic redistribution of
Fourth Amendment protections. The Fourth Amendment has long
been understood as balancing two key interests: individual privacy and
governmental needs. 58 By moving the Fourth Amendment into the
public sphere, new limitations were needed to balance the newly expanded coverage. Changing technology meant that there were novel
ways to communicate and surveil, so information moving outside the
home needed protection. 59 But if the distinction between what was in
the home and what was out of the home was no longer a limiting
principle, a different means of determining which places outside of the
home were protected was required. The solution Katz provided was to
shift the focus to one of knowledgeable public exposure: “What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.” 60 The public exposure limit was
essential for the Katzian test not to be all-encompassing. However, the
public exposure qualification also had limits, ones that shortly came to
be misunderstood by the Court itself, allowing instead for the public
exposure caveat to swallow up much of the Fourth Amendment
protection of Katz.

56 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
58 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (noting that the reasonableness of
a search “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests”).
59 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 476, 515 (2011) (“[T]he power to monitor communications in a phone booth when
a person placed a call was the modern equivalent to the power to break into a home and
listen to conversations there.”).
60 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52 (internal citations omitted) (first citing Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); then citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927);
then citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); and then citing Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1878)).
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B. Losing Katz’s First Prong: Unknowingly Shared Is Not “Knowingly
Expose[d]”
The first two post-Katz cases that addressed shared information
accessed without a warrant misread both prongs of the Katz test,
effectively replacing a reasonableness analysis with a per se rule based
solely on whether information was shared with any third party. 61 These
two cases, United States v. Miller 62 and Smith v. Maryland, 63 laid the
groundwork for a per se third-party doctrine that is ill-suited for our
modern information-sharing age. 64
In 1973, following the discovery of illegal whiskey distilling
equipment on property owned by Mitch Miller, investigators from the
Treasury Department’s Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau
subpoenaed local banks holding Mr. Miller’s accounts to provide all
records of his bank transactions to date to a grand jury. 65 The banks
complied, and the records were used as supporting evidence in Miller’s
trial. 66 Miller challenged the warrantless seizure of his bank documents, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation that they would
be kept private. 67 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Miller
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents. 68 In
making this determination, the Court quoted the relevant language
from Katz. 69 Yet the Court went through none of the Katzian voluntary
exposure to the public analysis, writing only that “[a]ll of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips,
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.” 70 The
Court continued: “The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”71
The Court’s analysis assumes that it was unreasonable to expect
documents given to a bank teller to remain private without explaining
61 Under the correct Katzian analysis, both cases likely would have come out
differently. See discussion infra Section III.D.
62 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
63 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
64 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”).
65 Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 442.
68 Id. at 443.
69 Id. at 442.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
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why Miller should have known that he lacked any privacy right in the
financial documents, either subjectively—for example, asking if the
bank teller mentioned anything about document privacy to Miller—or
objectively—for example, asking if the bank had a posted policy about
document privacy. The Court instead points to the fact that banks
must keep transaction records under the Bank Secrecy Act and
syllogistically reasons that (1) since banks have to keep records, and
(2) banks are a third party, (3) information shared with banks is
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. 72 In doing so, it is quietly
substituting an overly simplistic and underinclusive categorical sharing
rule in place of a case-by-case Katzian analysis of privacy expectations.
The analysis in Miller took a large leap away from Katz’s two-prong
test. Like a game of judicial telephone, in the next major case, Smith
v. Maryland, the Court relied on Miller’s misreading of Katz to further
misinterpret the “voluntary sharing with the public” notion. 73 In 1976,
Baltimore police suspected Michael Lee Smith in a robbery; police
believed that the robber had then begun making threatening phone
calls to the victim, but police had little evidence and no probable
cause. 74 Investigators contacted the telephone company and requested, without a warrant, that a pen register—a device that records
the numbers dialed by a particular phone line—be placed on Smith’s
home telephone. 75 The pen register recorded a phone call from Smith
to the victim, and police then used this information to get a warrant to
search Smith’s home, where they discovered evidence linking him to
the robbery. 76 Smith challenged the legality of the warrantless use of
the pen register, claiming that it was an illegal search under the Fourth
Amendment. 77
The Court held that the use of the pen register was not a search.
According to the majority, “[t]his Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”78 The Court continued:
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and “exposed”
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching
equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern
counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 443–44.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 743–44.
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completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he
had placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no
legitimate expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that
a different constitutional result is required because the telephone
company has decided to automate. 79

By equating an automated system with a human third party, Smith
completes the transition from Katzian privacy analysis to Miller’s
categorical privacy assumptions. After Smith, information that no
human being is ever likely to see is considered shared with a third
party. This jump was problematic back in 1976 but it is downright
dangerous in our current digital world; now, third parties host emails,
store photos, and record health data and travel information. 80 By
assuming the privacy analysis and extending that to automated systems,
the Smith Court left little room for any privacy expectation in an
enormous number of activities of modern life.
The combination of first equating “exposure” with sharing in a
public way and then further equating sharing with an automated third
party as sharing with an individual is particularly dangerous, as the
dissent notes:
[E]ven assuming, as I do not, that individuals “typically know” that
a phone company monitors calls for internal reasons, . . . it does
not follow that they expect this information to be made available to
the public in general or the government in particular. Privacy is
not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. 81

As the dissent points out, the majority opinion rests on two faulty
conclusions. First, that it is reasonable to know exactly what happens
when you make a phone call, and second, that knowing a third party
has access to your information means a reasonable person should
expect that information has been exposed to the public. 82 This
misreading further entrenched the move from a two-pronged public
exposure test to a per se sharing rule. In making this radical yet
unacknowledged transformation, the Court further exposed everyday
activities to the risk of greater state intrusion.

79 Id. at 744–45 (internal citation omitted) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–
5, 11–12, 32, Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (No. 78-5374)).
80 See Section III.C below for further discussion on the significance of having no
human agent.
81 Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (citing
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (majority opinion)).
82 See id. at 749–50.
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1. Jettisoning the “Knowingly” Requirement: Introducing
“Voluntariness”
The first prong of the third-party test articulated by Katz, whether
the information has been “knowingly expose[d],” itself has two parts:
“knowingly” and “expose[d].” 83 In addition to substituting a per se
sharing rule in place of a case-by-case Katzian analysis to assess if
information has been “knowingly” shared, the Court in Miller and
Smith also redefined both specific elements of the first prong. We deal
with each in turn.
Katz explicitly included a knowledge requirement, but neither
Miller nor Smith incorporate this as part of their analysis. In Miller, the
bank kept records of transactions and deposits as required by the Bank
Secrecy Act. 84 As the dissent notes, “[i]t cannot be gainsaid that the
customer of a bank expects that the documents, such as checks, which
he transmits to the bank in the course of his business operations, will
remain private, and that such an expectation is reasonable.” 85 Yet, the
opinion of the Court did not address whether or not Miller knew these
records were being kept, and for what purpose. Nevertheless, it found
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to these records. 86
In Smith, the Court did address the knowledge element but
disposed of it with little analytical rigor, relying on a bald assertion of
what the public is likely to know:
[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must
“convey” phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.
All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for
making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of
their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact, pen registers
and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies “for the
purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and preventing
violations of law.” 87

What is especially troubling about this disregard for the
knowledge component is that, unlike in Miller, Smith “shared” his
phone call information with an automated system that facilitates
phone calls. How can something be knowingly exposed to an
83 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (first citing Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); and then citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
84 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
85 Id. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Ct., 529 P.2d 590,
593–96 (Cal. 1974)).
86 Id. at 440.
87 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–75
(1977)).
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automated conduit, to a third party whose entire purpose is to process
that information? In Miller and Smith, the Court effectively read the
knowledge requirement out of the third-party doctrine, and in doing
so, it left unprotected a host of records and information kept,
knowingly or unknowingly, by any third party, regardless of their
purpose within the information transaction—both the type of
information available in the 1970s when the Court was deciding these
cases, but also vast amounts of information that would come to be
voluntarily “shared” in the future. 88
Without a strong knowledge prong, complacency increases the
risk of privacy loss. As technology becomes more ubiquitous and more
automated, the government gains greater access into users’ activities
and personal lives. 89 For example, in the 1980s and early 1990s, courts
routinely found that communication over cordless telephones was
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment because their signals could be
intercepted by AM/FM radios or common radio equipment purchasable at any electronics store. 90 Despite Katz’s explicit acknowledgement
of the importance of telephonic communication and the general
Fourth Amendment special protection of the home, 91 the ubiquity of
the radio equipment alone gave the government access to all
communication over cordless phones.
An element that makes the Court approving government access
to otherwise private information via the third-party doctrine especially
dangerous is the issue of where the government is going to access this
data. This information is not being gathered from people with their
consent in any meaningful way and then marshalled by the government to combat this disease. Instead, third parties like Facebook and
Google, with whom millions of Americans constantly share their
location information simply by having their applications on their
phones, 92 are collecting and giving this information to the government
upon request. 93 As such, anyone who wants to have a cell phone—

88 See discussion infra subsection I.B.2.
89 David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143,
202 (2002); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[I]t seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of
intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.”).
90 Sklansky, supra note 89, at 203.
91 See discussion infra Section II.A.
92 Justin Pot, Facebook Is Tracking Your Phone’s Location, Here’s How to Review Your
History, HOW-TO GEEK (May 30, 2018), https://www.howtogeek.com/fyi/facebook-istracking-your-phones-location-heres-how-to-review-your-history/
[https://perma.cc
/C8DE-DCGU].
93 See Jack Nicas & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple and Google Team Up to ‘Contact Trace’
the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10
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something that the Court in Carpenter recognized as so fundamental to
modern life that government access to certain types of information
constituted an exception to the third-party doctrine’s per se
application 94—will, without a similar exception being crafted by the
Court, have “voluntarily” shared that private health information.
This chipping away at the knowledge requirement is particularly
pertinent in response to government efforts to control the spread of
COVID-19. Many countries, including the United States, have turned
to electronic surveillance as a means of both tracking those infected 95
and monitoring adherence to social distancing guidelines. 96 While the
Court’s decision in Carpenter could apply to this gathering of data,
there is a strong logical argument that, because the information is
shared with a third party, the Fourth Amendment would be
inapplicable. Given the fact that this type of location data can be used
for everything from commercial advertisements to identifying who
attends political campaign events, 97 relying on the “goodwill” of the
government and multi-billion-dollar companies in handling sensitive
and private information seems insufficient. 98 Even if such access
begins in the context of a global pandemic, once so accessed, the
current Court interpretation of the third-party doctrine would render
it forever able to be accessed, as it will have been deemed to be publicly
exposed. 99 Clearly, a knowledge component, as articulated in Katz,
would better protect information like this from falling victim to

/technology/apple-google-coronavirus-contact-tracing.html
[https://perma.cc/2RNPUTRL].
94 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“We decline to extend
Smith and Miller to cover these novel circumstances. Given the unique nature of cell phone
location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself
overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
95 Nicas & Wakabayashi, supra note 93.
96 Craig Timberg, Elizabeth Dwoskin, Drew Harwell & Tony Romm, Governments
Around the World Are Trying a New Weapon Against Coronavirus: Your Smartphone, WASH. POST
(Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/17/governmentsaround-world-are-trying-new-weapon-against-coronavirus-your-smartphone/
[https://
perma.cc/9SKD-PM9S].
97 Sam Schechner, Emily Glazer & Patience Haggin, Political Campaigns Know Where
You’ve Been. They’re Tracking Your Phone, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/political-campaigns-track-cellphones-to-identify-and-target-individual-voters11570718889 [https://perma.cc/6YV6-CLSG].
98 Sara Morrison, The Government Might Want Your Phone Location Data to Fight
Coronavirus. Here’s Why That Could Be Okay, VOX (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.vox.com
/recode/2020/3/18/21184160/government-location-data-coronavirus [https://perma.cc
/ZZ83-F6WG] (“Right now, we’re relying on the goodwill of both the government and the
tech companies to have our interests in mind.”).
99 See Conclusion below for further discussion of the impact of the third-party
doctrine on the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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societal complacency and provide better protection as more
technology is unknowingly shared with more facilitating third parties.
2. Redefining Any Sharing as “Exposure”
Not only did the Courts in Miller and Smith read the “knowingly”
requirement out of the Katz test, they equated exposure with sharing.
This is still the current standard set by the Court, 100 and a common
standard by which the Fourth Amendment is approached
academically. 101 Yet we show here that these words differ at the plain
meaning level, and that ignoring this difference has led to an
expansive rule that over time encompasses more and more
information shared, sent, and stored through third parties.
To “expose” is defined as “to make known” and “to cause to be
visible or open to view.” 102 It can be accomplished with a third party
or without. This has two significant implications: first, the onus rests
on the exposer, not on any particular recipient. Second, this
emphasizes that the “knowingly expose” and the “to the public”
requirements both have a public element to them—the former in
terms of the action of the sharer and the latter in terms of the nature
of the recipient. This second aspect illustrates both that the “public”
element should not be downplayed, since it is twice incorporated in
the test, and it again emphasizes that the Katz test draws distinctions
between the sharer and the recipient—our solution explores the
significance of these demarcated roles. 103 It is also important to retain
the public distinction: as Judge Posner writes, “[o]ne must not confuse
solitude with secrecy.” 104 The Katz test specifically uses the word
“expose,” and the Court has since reinforced that language. 105

See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 140 (2006) (“Informational privacy does not mean refusing to share
information with everyone.”); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002)
(“[T]reating exposure to a limited audience as identical to exposure to the world, means
failing to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context.”); Kerr, supra
note 31, at 571 (“The Justices envision privacy as an on-off switch, equating disclosure to
one with disclosure to all, and as a result they miss the many shades of gray.”).
102 Expose, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expose
[https://perma.cc/B4UN-G7QF].
103 See infra Section III.C.
104 POSNER, supra note 101, at 140.
105 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into
question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.”).
100
101
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To “share,” on the other hand, is defined as “to partake of, use . . .
to grant or give a share in.” 106 In contrast to exposing, sharing is
defined by the relationship between the sharer and the recipient. This
difference is not simply rhetorical. If you write a confession to a crime
on a piece of paper and tape it to your forehead, you are exposing that
information. If you write your confession on a piece of paper, fold it
up, and give it to a friend to keep in their pocket, you have shared it
with them, but it has not yet been exposed. This is a vital distinction.
The friend has autonomy to do with your confession what they want.
Your friend might be false, and they might share your confession with
the police. But significance of the truth or falsity of their friendship is
governed by a separate doctrine, the false-friend doctrine. 107 The
third-party doctrine is instead focused on whether actions taken by the
primary individual reveal the information. And as Katz made clear,
sharing information—be it a confession written on a piece of paper or
betting information shared over the telephone—is not the same as
exposing it: Katz shared that information with his friend but he did not
expose it, and so it was still protected. 108
Legally, reading these two different concepts as one created a rule
that was too expansive and so left too much information open for
warrantless collection. As Katz shared his betting information with his
friend, Miller may have shared his deposit slips and bank statements
with bank employees who handled those documents, and Smith may
have shared the numbers he dialed with the phone company, in that
he gave them to an automated system owned by the company.
However, the Court never grapples with the complexity of the Katz
standard, instead opting to revoke Fourth Amendment protection
because the information was voluntarily conveyed to a third party,
which, to the Court, necessarily means that the information has been
“exposed.”109
This misreading also runs counter to one of Katz’s more
groundbreaking principles: that unavoidable provision of information
does not equal exposure. While it may be unavoidable that pen
numbers are shared with the telephone company, or that copies of
deposited checks pass through the hands of bank employees, it was also
unavoidable that sound leaks out of a public telephone booth or a
person’s lips can be read. However, as the Court said in Katz, once the
106 Share, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/share
[https://perma.cc/VS6B-5Q5Z].
107 The false-friend doctrine holds that a person “assumes the risk” in sharing
information with a third party that the person may betray them, but if that betrayal does
not occur, the information remains protected—discussed in detail below in Section I.D.
108 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
109 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976).
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toll is paid and the door is shut, that information is nevertheless
inaccessible without a warrant. 110 Information can be unavoidably
shared, just as if a passerby had overheard Katz talking in the phone
booth. But when the standard is knowing exposure, information does
not lose its Fourth Amendment protection simply because a third party
has access to it.
C. Abandoning Katz’s Second Prong: The Disappearing “Public”
The second prong of the third-party test articulated by Katz is
whether the information has been knowingly exposed to the public. 111
Again, the Court in Miller and Smith misread Katz, equating the public
as equivalent to any single third party. 112 Not only does this run
contrary to the plain meaning of “public,” which is defined as
“exposed to general view,” 113 but it also runs contrary to the way “the
public” is viewed by the Court in other doctrines. In the seminal
defamation case, Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Court wrote, “We also
recognized that privacy interests fade once information already
appears on the public record.”114 Privacy interests did not fade once a
third party had access to the information; rather, those interests were
limited when it appeared on the broader public record. Similarly, in
patent law, the Court has written that the public domain encompasses
works “already available to the public or that which may be readily
discerned from publicly available material.” 115 Something does not
enter the public domain when it is shared with another person, but
rather when it is “available to the public” more broadly.
The distinction between a third party and the public is important
when the facts of Katz are examined in more detail. Katz disclosed his
conversation to the recipient, and possibly the phone company that
connected the call, in the same way that Smith disclosed the telephone
numbers he dialed to the telephone company and Miller conveyed the
checks he deposited to the bank employees. Miller and Smith assumed
that when a third party has access to information, that information is

110 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
111 Id. at 351 (majority opinion) (first citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210
(1966); and then citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
112 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (Miller shared his bank records with a single entity: the
bank); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (Smith shared his phone numbers with
a single entity: the phone company).
113 Public, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/public
[https://perma.cc/J2JU-LRAX].
114 Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 n.7 (1989) (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 494–95 (1975)).
115 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989).
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no longer shielded by the Fourth Amendment. 116 Katz never made that
jump. In fact, Katz would have come out differently if it was decided
after Miller and Smith overlaid their interpretation of Katz itself on the
third-party doctrine. In the words of Smith, by sharing the phone call
with the call recipient, Mr. Katz
can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here. When he used
his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed [his conversation] to the
[recipient] and “exposed” that information . . . in the ordinary
course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that
the [recipient] would reveal to police the [contents of the
conversation]. 117

Yet, this quote perfectly describes what Katz did. By equating the risk
that a single third party might reveal information with exposure to the
public, Miller and Smith contradicted their progenitor, Katz.
In an effort to solve this problem with the Miller–Smith
interpretation of Katz, some scholars argue that “the public” indicates
a requirement that a larger audience have the information before the
Fourth Amendment is implicated. 118 However, this solution is itself
problematic. The use of the word “public” typically denotes an
exposure level, not a size of audience. Furthermore, the way the Court
has interpreted the concept of the “public” in the aforementioned
defamation and patent contexts makes it clear that something can be
in the public domain and yet seen by nobody. The requirement is that
is must be available to the public. It is unwieldy, both for government
agents and reviewing courts, to turn Fourth Amendment protections
on and off based on the size of the audience. Likewise, in Katz, it was
central that by shutting the door and paying the toll, the conversation
was deemed not available to the public. But in the same way, neither
dialing a phone number automatically recorded by a telephone
company nor depositing a check with a bank teller make that
information available to the public.
If Person A posts a confession to a crime to their 10,000 followers
on Twitter, that confession has obviously been knowingly exposed to
the public. If Person B posts a confession to a crime to Twitter, but
they have zero followers, then nobody can see their posts, but they have
likewise exposed their information to the public, assuming their
profile is not private. Both Person A and Person B have paid no toll,
shut no door, nor exhibited any actions indicating an intent to retain
116 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
117 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
118 Colb, supra note 101, at 153 (critiquing allowing “government officials to treat as
knowingly exposed to the world (and thus to the police as well) not only those things that
have been exposed to the public at large, but also those things that have been knowingly
exposed to any third party”).
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their right to privacy. Both have knowingly shared with the public—
the mere availability of each post triggers the second prong, regardless
of the size of the audience.
*

*

*

Both elements—knowing exposure and to the public—create a
commonsense limitation on Fourth Amendment protection in the
public sphere, one that balances expanded privacy protection for
“people, not places,” 119 with government investigatory needs. The per
se sharing doctrine articulated by Miller and Smith was a misreading of
Katz that risks leaving a significant amount of personal information
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The per se rule is simple to
apply but is increasingly hard to justify in the information age.
Returning to the two-part third-party test articulated in Katz provides
more analytical nuance and allows the Fourth Amendment to
appropriately recalibrate with changing technology.
D. Trust Nobody: False Friends and Third Parties
In establishing a per se third-party doctrine, where any sharing is
automatically treated as abolishing any reasonable expectation of
privacy, Miller and Smith relied in large part on the Court’s false-friend
jurisprudence. The false-friend doctrine holds that when a person
shares information with another person, they “assume the risk” that
the recipient is a false friend working with the government. 120
According to the Court, because any friend could potentially be false,
the sharer cannot rely on a reasonable expectation of privacy if the
friend shares the information, and so the Fourth Amendment does not
protect them. 121 There is clearly a similarity here between false friends
and third parties, but the two doctrines are different, and by conflating
them, the Court misunderstood them both, further distancing the
third-party doctrine from its legal and logical foundation in Katz.
To understand how the third-party doctrine was corrupted by
subsuming the false-friend doctrine, we need to briefly review the
development of the false-friend cases and the logic behind the
119 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
120 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952).
121 Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False Friends,
and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L.
REV. 253, 255 (2006) (“[E]vidence revealed to the government by a confidant of the
defendant is admissible precisely because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
such situations.”).
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doctrine. Prior to Miller, these cases were largely relegated to
conversations between individuals and undercover government
agents. 122 The logic was that because any friend can go to the police
and tell them the information or show them the incriminating
evidence, then having an undercover agent listen in on a conversation
is no different—the sharer has assumed the risk that the friend is false,
in one way or another. 123
Confidential informants, secret agents, and undercover operatives
have long been vital tools in government investigations. 124 In the first
of the Court’s major false-friend cases, On Lee v. United States, 125 the
government had arrested and charged On Lee for dealing narcotics. 126
While out on bail, On Lee had conversations in his laundromat with
Chin Poy, a former employee turned government agent, during which
he made “damaging admissions” about his case. 127 Unbeknownst to
On Lee, Chin Poy was wearing a wire, which transmitted his
conversations to government agents stationed outside. On Lee argued
that Chin Poy had trespassed when he entered the laundromat under
false pretenses. 128 The Court disagreed, holding that On Lee
consented to Chin Poy’s presence, regardless of the underlying
motives for the conversation. 129 Essentially, the Court embraced the
idea that a false friend can effectively undermine a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.
A decade later, the Court subsequently expanded this notion into
the home, in two major false-friend cases handed down on the same
day. In Lewis v. United States, 130 the defendant invited an undercover
government agent into his home in order to purchase narcotics. 131
Lewis argued that any warrantless government intrusion into his home
constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 132 Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the majority, disagreed, holding that, since the
government agent was invited into the home to purchase drugs and
had not affirmatively misrepresented his purpose in order to gain
122 See White, 401 U.S. at 746–47; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 296; Lewis, 385 U.S. at 207; On Lee,
343 U.S. at 747, 749.
123 White, 401 U.S. at 759 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The risk of being overheard by an
eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom
one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society.”).
124 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 576.
125 On Lee, 343 U.S. at 747.
126 Id. at 748.
127 Id. at 749.
128 Id. at 751–52.
129 Id. at 752.
130 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
131 Id. at 207.
132 Id. at 208.
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entry, the surreptitious purchase was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment and no warrant was required. 133 This expansion of the
false-friend doctrine made it clear that the special protection of the
home does not guard against a false friend—we are taking a risk when
we invite someone into our most intimate space, and can lose our
ordinary expected protections even within the home.
The second case, Hoffa v. United States, 134 reinforced the
application of the false-friend doctrine to the home (including the
temporary home of a hotel room), and also expanded the doctrine
further, including those paid to be false friends by the government. In
1962, James Hoffa, president of the Teamsters Union, was arrested and
charged with violating the Taft-Hartley Act. 135 While on trial, Hoffa
met with a co-defendant to discuss bribing jurors. 136 Edward Partin, a
Teamsters Union official and paid informant for the government, was
also in the room and overheard the comments. 137 He relayed the
conversation to a government agent, and the comments were later
used to convict Hoffa and his co-defendants for jury tampering.138
Hoffa argued that, because Partin did not disclose his role as a paid
informant, any consent Hoffa gave to Partin to be in the hotel room
was negated. 139 The Court disagreed. Writing for the plurality, Justice
Stewart wrote:
Partin did not enter the suite by force or by stealth. He was not a
surreptitious eavesdropper. Partin was in the suite by invitation,
and every conversation which he heard was either directed to him
or knowingly carried on in his presence. The petitioner, in a word,
was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was relying
upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his
wrongdoing. 140

Hoffa’s notion of “misplaced confidence” would go on to become
the crux of the false-friend doctrine. As long as the third party was a
friend (knowingly in the protected space), it did not matter what made
them false. But as we see below, this element came to be expanded far
more when applied beyond the context of friends, via incorporation
into the third-party doctrine, to include faceless organizations that an
individual does not know in any meaningful sense and has little choice

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 211.
385 U.S. 293 (1966).
See id. at 294.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 296, 298.
Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 302.
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over whether to “invite in” to their home and their other private
spaces.
On Lee, Lewis, and Hoffa allowed the government to do what they
otherwise could not—by using a third-party agent, government
investigators were able to gain access to the home and private property
of suspects in ways they could not do themselves without a warrant. 141
Yet these cases all predated Katz, and it was unclear if they would
survive the move to a reasonable expectation of privacy test.
The Court’s first opportunity to evaluate false-friend cases under
the new Katzian regime was United States v. White. 142 The facts of White
are quite similar to those in On Lee. James White was convicted on
charges of narcotics trafficking, largely based on conversations
between him and Harvey Jackson, a government informant. 143 Jackson
wore a radio transmitter that broadcast their conversations to nearby
police officers. 144 Justice White, writing for a plurality, affirmed the
legality of On Lee, Lewis, and Hoffa, explaining that
the law permits the frustration of actual expectations of privacy by
permitting authorities to use the testimony of those associates who
for one reason or another have determined to turn to the police,
as well as by authorizing the use of informants in the manner
exemplified by Hoffa and Lewis. 145

As well as confirming that the false-friend analysis applies under
Katz, White also extended the application of the doctrine to wireless
transmission, saying: “If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer
whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should
it protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the
conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the State’s
case.” 146 White has been criticized on both of these fronts. On the
former, critics have argued that whereas Katz sought to expand Fourth
Amendment protection for conversations that took place over
changing technology (the telephone), White eliminated protection
based on changing technology (radio transmitters). 147 On the latter,
White is criticized as undermining a person’s feeling of freedom and
141 See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 766 (1952) (Burton, J., dissenting) (“[I]f
Lee, under like conditions, without warrant and without authority, entered the room with
Chin Poy and, while concealed, overheard petitioner’s conversation with Chin Poy, Lee’s
testimony should be excluded.”).
142 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
143 Id. at 746–47 (plurality opinion).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 752.
146 Id.
147 Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 75–78 (2002) (“[T]he protective shield of Katz was just
as ineffective in Smith as it was in White.”).
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privacy by rendering a person subject to recording at any time, because
now a person has to assume not only that they could be talking to a
government agent, but that the person they are talking to could also
be wearing a wire. 148 But there is a much more fundamental problem
with White that has not been emphasized previously: by combining the
false-friend doctrine with the third-party doctrine, the Court in White
misunderstands both doctrines. This doctrinal confusion diminishes
privacy interests far more than the decision of whether a particular
technological development can be differentiated from the overall
direction of prior case law.
First, the false-friend doctrine was meant to be a narrow
exemption from the normal presumption of an expectation of privacy,
applying to a “wrongdoer[] . . . confid[ing] his wrongdoing.” 149
Under the Miller and White interpretation, now a “depositor . . .
revealing his affairs to another”150 loses his Fourth Amendment
protection simply because of the possibility “that the information will
be conveyed by that person to the Government.” 151 The Court took
the relatively narrow notion that all conversations with secret agents
are unprotected by the Fourth Amendment and expanded it,
effectively turning a person’s bank teller into an undercover agent for
the government. By equating these two doctrines, the Court answers
the age-old question: If a tree falls in the forest and nobody is around
to hear it, does it make a sound because the government could have
heard it? If so, that sound can be acquired without a warrant.
Second, the false-friend doctrine is premised on the notion that a
person takes a risk when confiding in a friend: the risk that that friend
may be false. But this notion of risk necessarily contains two potential
outcomes: if the friend is false, the confider loses out; but if the friend
is true, the confider has taken a risk but has won that gamble. Their
information has been shared with the friend, yet their privacy remains
intact. When the Court implicitly incorporated the false-friend
doctrine into the third-party doctrine, it warped this fundamental
logic. Rather than acknowledging these dual potential outcomes, the
Court assumed that when a person confides to a friend, or any third
party, that friend must be false. 152 But that is not the risk that the
person takes in taking a confidant: they risk the possibility of betrayal,
not the certainty. By treating any sharing as an automatic and entire
148 White, 401 U.S. at 790 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 749 (plurality opinion).
150 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
151 Id.
152 See id. (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.” (emphasis added) (citing
White, 401 U.S. at 751–52)).
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loss of any reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court is essentially
treating every friend as false. Thus, the third-party version of the falsefriend doctrine is a distorted one.
Third, the Court’s approach in combining the third-party and
false-friend doctrines undermines the very notion of the Katzian
reasonable expectation of privacy. Under a reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis, the Court must ascertain whether the information
sharer reasonably expected their information to be exposed, and part
of that analysis is an inquiry into the knowledge of the individual. 153
Instead of undertaking this inquiry, Miller assumed all third parties
were false, and Smith similarly assumed everybody knew their friends
were false. 154 In Smith, the Court’s analysis of the reasonable
expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers utilized a very thin
application of facts—claiming that “all subscribers” know that the
phone company records which numbers are dialed, 155 a factual claim
that was somewhat dubious at the time, as the dissent notes 156—and
concluded therefore that there is no expectation of privacy in a
person’s call log. 157 Having undertaken this Katzian analysis once, in
the context of a landline phone system, the Court then assumed that
conclusion to apply in all other cases, by making the third-party doctrine
categorical rather than a case-by-case assessment. However, regardless
of the rigor—or lack thereof—in the Court’s factual claim and its legal
conclusion, telephones were just one very limited factual application.
Since then, the Court has simply assumed that same conclusion applies
to numerous other factual questions, regardless of whether the
application is to entirely different technology (such as an encrypted
email account), whether the technology application is completely
automated and always has been (unlike the previously sentient
telephone operator), and whether the equivalent of the phone book
information is available to the new technology user (or if in fact the
provider has made promises not to access such information).
For example, it would be difficult for a court to conclude—
without blushing—that a person has no expectation of privacy in their
heart rate information just because they use a third-party application

153 Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139,
152 (2016).
154 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (“[I]t is too
much to believe that telephone subscribers . . . harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret.”).
155 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
156 Id. at 748–49 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (analyzing the claim that “individuals
somehow infer from the long-distance listings on their phone bills . . . that pen registers are
regularly used for recording local calls”).
157 Id. at 743 (majority opinion).
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in their watch. 158 But instead of undertaking the difficult task of
explaining why a person should not have any privacy expectation in
their heart rate information, the Court need only cite Miller and assume
that answer, based on the automatic application of the third-party
doctrine. Then a court need only ask if there was some exception that
might apply, based on the scope of the governmental inquiry 159 or the
nature of the intrusion. 160 But what Katz requires is that the court ask
that more difficult question. The Court in Smith provided a roadmap
for avoiding Katz’s difficult knowledge question; by assuming the
implicit claim when making this third-party argument, the Court had
no need to examine the individual or societal expectations of privacy
in telephones, or heart rate monitors, or any other application where
a third party has a person’s information, however private it may appear
to the ordinary person.
*

*

*

If knowledge is a required part of the analysis, why does the Court
so often avoid this inquiry that Katz demands? It is likely an issue of
judicial economy: evaluating the societal and individual knowledge of
a particular subject on a case-by-case basis, especially in today’s
information age, would be fact- and resource-intensive, and would
likely lead to legal uncertainty as different courts apply different
standards to determine what is “reasonable.” 161 So, if it is problematic
to assume knowledge of a third party’s actions, but it also impractical
to gauge that knowledge on a case-by-case basis, what is the solution?
Our solution provides a straightforward mechanism for ascertaining
whether a person in fact has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
given situation, including using a third-party application, without those
additional resource costs. Applying the “knowing exposure to the
public” analysis provides the best of both worlds—by looking at who
the individual is contracting with and the circumstances of that
contract, it is easy to efficiently and effectively assess whether a
158 Cf. Kris Holt, Fitbit Data Helps Police Arrest Another Murder Suspect, ENGADGET (Oct.
4, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018-10-04-fitbit-data-heart-rate-murder-arrest.html
[https://perma.cc/UHV4-3S8X] (describing an investigation in which police used a
murder victim’s heart rate data recorded on her Fitbit to identify her alleged killer).
159 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.3 (2018) (“It is sufficient for
our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search.”).
160 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that warrantless
government use of technology not in public use—in this case a thermal detection device
used to detect heat spikes—to search a home is unconstitutional).
161 See Section III.B below for more on the difficulty of applying a reasonableness
standard to the third-party doctrine.
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reasonable person would have an expectation of privacy or not. This
gets at the Katzian mandate without being so fact-intensive as to be
uncertain, as explored further in Part III. But first, Part II illustrates
why this is not simply a concern about doctrinal purity: it shows that
the actual effect of the Court’s distorted third-party doctrine has the
potential to massively contract and contort privacy interests that society
recognizes as reasonable and that individuals hold dear.
II.

WHEN THE CURE IS WORSE THAN THE DISEASE

Over one hundred million Alexa-enabled devices sit inside
customers’ homes, constantly listening as they wait for a “wake word”
to activate. 162 Once that word is spoken, Alexa devices continue to
record for a period of time after communication has ended. 163 That
information is stored forever in order to learn from and remember a
user’s commands. 164 And while companies like Amazon have so far
been resistant to revealing information to the government without a
warrant, the value of an in-home recording device has not gone
unnoticed by the police. 165 Similarly, Nest, the camera and thermostat
company, has received over three hundred information requests from
the government since 2015. 166 Nest thermostats use biometric sensors
to record when their users are physically at home and which rooms
they use most often to create a tailored and efficient heating and
cooling schedule. 167 Information given to Alexa or Nest from within
the home has been shared, often in the ordinary course of business,
with a third party. As such, under the Court’s current articulation of
the third-party doctrine, that information is likely accessible without a
warrant by government investigators.
This Part examines how the Court’s current categorical thirdparty doctrine applies to these and other modern applications. It
162 Judith Shulevitz, Alexa, Should We Trust You?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/alexa-how-will-you-change-us/570844/
[https://perma.cc/2ZHT-XBJ7].
163 Id.
164 Geoffrey A. Fowler, Alexa Has Been Eavesdropping on You This Whole Time, WASH.
POST (May 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/06/alexahas-been-eavesdropping-you-this-whole-time/ [https://perma.cc/Y4T9-P9D3].
165 Burke, supra note 10; Zack Whittaker, Judge Orders Amazon to Turn Over Echo
Recordings in Double Murder Case, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2018), https://techcrunch.com
/2018/11/14/amazon-echo-recordings-judge-murder-case/
[https://perma.cc/L3CPTQ4P].
166 Thomas Brewster, Smart Home Surveillance: Governments Tell Google’s Nest to Hand
Over Data 300 Times, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/thomasbrewster/2018/10/13/smart-home-surveillance-governments-tell-googles-nest-tohand-over-data-300-times/ [https://perma.cc/5SBV-MDFK].
167 See Fowler, supra note 164.
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shows that, as technology rapidly progresses, the implications of the
Court’s approach continue to massively expand the potential for state
intrusion on individual privacy. It also shows that the doctrine does so
in a way that is inconsistent with much else of Fourth Amendment law.
A. How Special Is the Home?
It is well-established that the “Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm
line at the entrance to the house.’”168 The idea that a person’s home
is their sanctuary, unreachable by government intrusion “without
some specific charge upon oath,”169 was a widely accepted feature of
pre-Revolution English common law. 170 It was the Founders’ “desire
to protect the privacy and security of their homes from promiscuous
intrusion” that led to the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 171
For over a century, the boundaries of the home were where the
Fourth Amendment began and ended. Courts literally parsed whether
government intrusion pierced 172 or merely touched173 the outer walls
of a house to determine if an action constituted a search. This
presumptive protection of the home implicitly acknowledges that
illegal actions can be rendered unreachable by virtue of their taking
place inside the home, and the Court has struck this balance time 174
and again, 175 protecting illegal behavior that occurred within the home
from warrantless government intrusion. The focus was where the
168 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980)).
169 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1237
(2016) (quoting J. ALMON, A LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, THE SEIZURE OF
PAPERS, AND SURETIES FOR THE PEACE OR BEHAVIOUR; WITH A VIEW TO SOME LATE
PROCEEDINGS, AND THE DEFENCE OF THEM BY THE MAJORITY 58 (3d ed., London 1765)
(signed by “The Father of Candor”)).
170 See Entick v. Carrington [1765] EWHC (KB) J98, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (finding that the
King’s agents had trespassed); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A
Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 933 (1997) (describing the reversal of the common
law presumption that “an Englishman’s home was the King’s castle” to a person’s own);
Donohue, supra note 169, at 1203 (“In vain has our house been declared, by the law, our
asylum and defence, if it is capable of being entered, upon any frivolous or no pretence at
all, by a secretary of state.” (quoting Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490)).
171 Maclin, supra note 170, at 955.
172 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (holding that warrantless
use of a “spike mike” to penetrate walls and eavesdrop was unconstitutional).
173 See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942) (holding that
warrantless use of a detectaphone pressed up against the wall of an adjoining room and
used to eavesdrop was constitutional).
174 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
175 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (holding that bringing a drug-sniffing dog
onto a private porch without a warrant was unconstitutional).
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government accessed the information, an inquiry firmly rooted in the
doctrine of trespass, which meant that while behavior that remained
within the home could be protected, behavior that began in the home
but was observed in public was not. 176
The inquiry shifted after Katz, expanding protection to
temporarily private applications outside the home. Developing the
new “reasonable expectation of privacy” test in place of trespass
analysis, the Court reformulated the Fourth Amendment as protecting
“people, not places.” 177 The Fourth Amendment was now free to enter
the public sphere. But, despite the (temporary) move away from a
trespass-defined doctrine, importantly, Katz was meant to expand
beyond the confines of the home, not to undermine the special
protection for the home. 178 However, subsequent interpretation of
Katz via the third-party doctrine used reasonable expectation analysis
to radically undermine the protection of the home.
The uniqueness of the home permeates the jurisprudence of the
Fourth Amendment. In Kyllo v. United States, 179 government agents
used a thermal imaging device to show that an unusual amount of heat
was radiating from the petitioner’s garage. This information was used
to obtain a search warrant for petitioner’s home on the assumption
that the halide lights used to grow marijuana indoors create an unusual
amount of heat. Agents subsequently found over one hundred
marijuana plants growing in petitioner’s garage. The Court held that
the warrantless use of the thermal imaging device was an impermissible
search because the Fourth Amendment “draws ‘a firm line at the
entrance to the house.’”180 The Court refused to limit this special
protection by assessing “which home activities are ‘intimate’ and which
are not.” 181 In Florida v. Jardines, 182 the sanctity of the home was so
strong that Court held the warrantless use of a drug-sniffing dog—
ordinarily not a search at all 183—was an unconstitutional search when
conducted on the front porch of a private residence. 184

176 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
177 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
178 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012).
179 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
180 Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (2012)).
181 Id. at 38–39.
182 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
183 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[E]xposure of respondent’s
luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine—did not constitute a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
184 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (noting that “the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” is at the “very core” of the
Fourth Amendment).
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The sanctity of the home in the search and seizure context has
persisted for centuries and remains a pivotal part of nearly every
application of the Fourth Amendment. 185 Yet the one area where the
home’s heightened protection is not respected is in the third-party
doctrine. As the Court held in Smith, the government could access the
phone numbers dialed in the privacy of Smith’s home because they
had been exposed to the phone company. 186 Similarly, in White, the
Court held that the government could use a wireless transmission that
incriminated the defendant, even when one of those conversations
took place in the defendant’s home. 187 The current third-party
doctrine’s ability to pierce the home puts one of the bastions of the
Fourth Amendment at risk.
The significance of the potential intrusion that this doctrine
permits has only increased with rapidly developing technology, such as
communication services. In 2008, Skype, a telecommunications
application that specializes in providing video chat and voice calls
between computers and tablets, categorically denied the possibility
that their peer-to-peer online voice and video calls could be tapped. 188
Microsoft walked that language back after purchasing Skype in 2011,
and for good reason: a 2012 National Security Agency (NSA)
document conveniently titled “User’s Guide for PRISM Skype
Collection” was part of a trove of leaked documents detailing how
Microsoft allowed the NSA access to its servers in order to search and
monitor communication over the Skype system. While this warrantless
monitoring ostensibly targeted only non-U.S. citizens, what was
eventually recorded was a network of information including anything
said or chatted between the targeted individual and any recipient,
citizen or not. 189 Why did Microsoft feel free to give the NSA this kind
of extensive access to its users’ data? The reason is that the Court’s
expansive interpretation of the third-party doctrine has given
governments and companies expansive powers over individuals’
otherwise private information. Quite simply, Skype users were not
protected by the Fourth Amendment because their information was
carried by a third party.
185 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) (holding that a vehicle parked on the
curtilage of the home cannot be searched without a warrant).
186 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
187 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971).
188 Declan McCullagh, NSA Docs Boast: Now We Can Wiretap Skype Video Calls, CNET
(July 11, 2013), https://www.cnet.com/news/nsa-docs-boast-now-we-can-wiretap-skypevideo-calls/ [https://perma.cc/QA2F-2U92].
189 Sean Gallagher, Newly Published NSA Documents Show Agency Could Grab All Skype
Traffic, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 30, 2014), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/12
/newly-published-nsa-documents-show-agency-could-grab-all-skype-traffic/ [https://perma
.cc/85PP-ADPL].

NDL207_JACOBI_STONECIPHER_02_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

A SOLUTION FOR THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

3/23/2022 4:03 PM

855

Those same leaked documents showed that, from 2003 to 2013, 190
AT&T gave the NSA access to billions of emails that passed through its
domestic networks. 191 AT&T was “highly collaborative,” installing
surveillance equipment for the government in seventeen of its
American internet hubs. 192 In 2011, AT&T began handing over 1.1
billion domestic calling records per day. 193 And while the NSA’s
program was shuttered in 2017, a recent report confirmed that AT&T
continues to give Drug Enforcement Administration officers access to
billions of domestic and international call records which show when
and where calls were made and by whom. 194 Again, AT&T was free to
do so because calls and emails made from inside the home were likely
left unprotected simply because they were managed by a third party,
AT&T.
In 2019, a cache of leaked documents revealed that Skype relied
on human contractors to augment their translation service. 195 As these
documents showed, Skype’s translation service, ostensibly run by
artificial intelligence and machine learning software, often used
human contractors to analyze voice data and improve the AI’s
algorithms. 196 Skype’s website did mention that calls may be analyzed
to improve translation functionality, yet nowhere did it say that
countless third-party Skype employees were part of that process. 197
While Microsoft responded that all identifying information was
removed before the contractors were given access, they did not deny
that Microsoft employees not only had the ability, but also the
employment responsibility, to listen in as users conducted job
interviews, repeated names and full addresses, discussed travel plans,
or even engaged in phone sex. 198 Had the government requested
190 Julia Angwin, Charlie Savage, Jeff Larson, Henrik Moltke, Laura Poitras & James
Risen, AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/us/politics/att-helped-nsa-spy-on-an-array-of-internettraffic.html [https://perma.cc/75CD-4L5K].
191 Id.; Dante D’Orazio, Leaked NSA Documents Show AT&T Had a ‘Highly Collaborative’
Relationship with Spy Agency, VERGE (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/8/15
/9159777/att-had-a-highly-collaborative-relationship-with-the-nsa
[https://perma.cc/MY4X-DAXN].
192 Angwin et al., supra note 190.
193 Id.
194 Zack Whittaker, DEA Says AT&T Still Provides Access to Billions of Phone Records,
TECHCRUNCH (March 28, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/28/hemispherephone-records/ [https://perma.cc/9KY8-R6HH].
195 Joseph Cox, Revealed: Microsoft Contractors Are Listening to Some Skype Calls, VICE:
MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xweqbq/microsoftcontractors-listen-to-skype-calls [https://perma.cc/EFB5-E5DU].
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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information from Skype about a user’s voice or video chat history,
under the Court’s current third-party jurisprudence, that information
was likely accessible by government investigators without a warrant,
even if the conversation occurred entirely in the caller’s home.
While a dog sniffing around on a person’s front porch is a Fourth
Amendment search, a doorbell recording that dog may not be, due to
the current third-party doctrine. Amazon has partnered its Ring
doorbell camera with over four hundred local police departments. 199
These police departments offer reduced cost, or even free, Ring
doorbell systems, often at taxpayer expense, in exchange for access to
a fast-growing network of private security cameras. 200 In some cases,
these Ring giveaways are conditioned on full release of videos upon
request. 201 Cooperating police departments also get access to the Ring
Neighbors app, a free download allowing Ring owners to post videos,
view crime information, and comment on other users’ posts. 202
Amazon, Ring’s parent company, has already developed facial
recognition software used by police nationwide. 203 As applied so far,
information is being shared with the police voluntarily, but if that were
not the case, it may make no difference, because of the Court’s
stringent interpretation of the third-party doctrine.
When the information is on—or even in—a person’s body, a
doctrine designed to address pen registers seems especially outdated.
Fitbit data has been used in several murder investigations to determine
time of death. 204 But there is no reason that police use of such
information need be limited to the information of the victim. By virtue
of wearing a Fitbit, users share their heart rate, location, distance
traveled, and even sleep patterns with a third party. Under the current
third-party doctrine, there is no privacy interest in that most
fundamentally personal information. As such, police could use Fitbit
incriminating evidence of the suspect’s increased heart rate, location
information, etc., at the time of a crime, all without a warrant.
In each of these real-world applications, information is shared
with a third party, and thus is fair game for government investigators. 205
199 Drew Harwell, Doorbell-Camera Firm Ring Has Partnered with 400 Police Forces,
Extending Surveillance Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-haspartnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach [https://perma.cc/FAP8-E8YZ].
200 Id.
201 Alfred Ng, Amazon’s Helping Police Build a Surveillance Network with Ring Doorbells,
CNET (June 5, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/features/amazons-helping-police-build-asurveillance-network-with-ring-doorbells/ [https://perma.cc/XC2R-XN7Y].
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See, e.g., Holt, supra note 158.
205 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
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And, in contrast to all other applications of Fourth Amendment
doctrine, this problem is not solved by the presumption of the home
protection, because the third-party doctrine has consistently been
interpreted to overcome that presumption and allow the government
to enter the home without a warrant. Thus, the Supreme Court’s
current interpretation of the third-party doctrine is not simply
incompatible with the foundational pillars of Katz, the landmark case
from which the doctrine was birthed; it is irreconcilable with all Fourth
Amendment doctrine in which the sanctity of the home is paramount.
B. Some People and Some Places
After Katz, the Fourth Amendment ostensibly protected people,
not places, expanding the Fourth Amendment beyond the confines of
the home and bringing it into the public sphere. Yet the Court has
been highly selective in how it has done so, using the current categorical approach to the third-party doctrine to pick and choose when and
to whom the Fourth Amendment applies, and when it does not.
DNA, the substance that literally makes a person one of “we the
people,” is potentially accessible to government agents under the
modern Court’s third-party approach. Tens of millions of people have
shared their DNA with companies like 23AndMe and Ancestry looking
for everything from genealogical history to medical data and disease
predisposition. 206 These companies are third parties; by sending in
DNA samples, customers are indirectly sharing this highly personal
information with government investigators, 207 and (often unwittingly)
adding their genetic information to national databases. 208 The thirdparty doctrine gives the lie to the constitutional protection of “people,
not places.”
Technological change is exacerbating this failure to protect
people and their most private information. As discussed, the Miller
Court established a categorical bar on Fourth Amendment protection
for information shared with third parties; because of this, even in the
face of quite different circumstances, the Court continues to fail to
206 Jessica Bursztynsky, More than 26 Million People Shared Their DNA with Ancestry Firms,
Allowing Researchers to Trace Relationships Between Virtually All Americans: MIT, CNBC (Feb.
12, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/12/privacy-concerns-rise-as-26-million-sharedna-with-ancestry-firms.html [https://perma.cc/KL82-L858].
207 Kristen V. Brown, Major DNA Testing Company Sharing Genetic Data with the FBI,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-01
/major-dna-testing-company-is-sharing-genetic-data-with-the-fbi [https://perma.cc/296GFC8A].
208 Sara Boboltz, Judge Says Police Can Search Company’s Entire DNA Database, HUFFPOST
(Nov. 5, 2019, 6:07 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/police-search-dna-database
_n_5dc1dc4ee4b08b735d616096 [https://perma.cc/4E62-ZFFB].

NDL207_JACOBI_STONECIPHER_02_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

858

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

3/23/2022 4:03 PM

[VOL. 97:2

apply Katz to quite different banking scenarios. Police officers
frequently use debit and credit card transactions to track suspected
criminals, accessed following a subpoena, or upon request to a third
party by government investigators. 209 Yet banking records have come
a long way from the paper statements in Miller. 210 Now, purchase
records can show the date and time of purchase, the location of the
purchase, and sometimes even the purchased product, all without a
warrant.
The Court worsened the problem in Jones, by promoting a trespass
analysis that, by the Court’s own analysis, has questionable application
in an increasingly technological world. 211 In reinvigorating the role of
trespass in search and seizure analysis, 212 the Court turned “people, not
places,” into (some) people and (some) places, re-emphasizing the
physical importance of the home and other property but leaving the
large hole in that doctrine represented by the third-party doctrine
unaddressed. The only Justice who addressed the issue at all cast doubt
on its long-term survival. As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence, the third-party doctrine, as articulated in Smith and Miller, is “ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks,” including “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club,
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and
on.” 213 But the Court has failed to heed Justice Sotomayor’s clarion
call on the dangers of the third-party doctrine. 214
The sole area in which the Court has addressed the problem is the
application of cell phone data. This is an important area for the thirdparty doctrine—not only is location information shared with a cellular
company (a third party), but smartphones contain thousands of thirdparty applications that monitor and record location and other

209 John Egan, How Credit Cards Can Lead Law Officers to Criminals, CREDITCARDS.COM
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-cards-trackcriminals.php [https://perma.cc/Y9EK-6YH6].
210 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 438 (1976).
211 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 426 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that
revitalizing trespass does not respond sufficiently to electronic searches).
212 Id. at 406 (majority opinion) (“[W]e must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”
(quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001))).
213 Id. at 415, 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d
1195, 1199 (2009)).
214 Discussed further below in Section III.A.
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personal information. 215 Yet the Court’s cell phone data doctrine, as
articulated in Carpenter, is both subjective and exceedingly narrow. 216
The Court refused to solve the broader difficulties created by its thirdparty doctrine, or even to recognize the breadth of those underlying
problems. 217 The Court reaffirmed Smith and Miller’s categorical
exemption for information shared with third parties generally, while
at the same time relying on an analysis of the quantity of the
information shared with the third party to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment applied in this narrow application. 218 As the
majority maintained, “[t]he Government will be able to use subpoenas
to acquire records in the overwhelming majority of investigations. We
hold only that a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect
has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.” 219
And that rare case involved the relatively high bar of “a detailed
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every
moment, over several years.” 220 After Jones and Carpenter, we are left
with a third-party doctrine that is categorical, unless it is isn’t; that
protects people, sometimes, but not places, including the home.
Our proposed reinterpretation of the third-party doctrine,
drawing it back to the fundamental principles of Katz, provides a
solution to both this doctrinal problem and the dilemmas raised by
these practical applications. Extending Fourth Amendment protection to data that is not knowingly exposed to the public, as Katz set out,
would better reconcile third-party doctrine with the “long view” of the
Fourth Amendment that the Court takes in other areas. 221 While many
of these situations involve warrant requests, others rely simply on
subpoenas. Constitutional privacy protections should not depend on
the judgement of private companies, substituting for the detached and
neutral judgment of a magistrate. Many companies may publicly

215 Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset,
Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12
/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html [https://perma.cc/3VSH-CG9M].
216 See discussion infra Conclusion.
217 Although the dissent did: Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Today we use the Internet to do most everything. Smartphones
make it easy to keep a calendar, correspond with friends, make calls, conduct banking, and
even watch the game. Countless Internet companies maintain records about us and,
increasingly, for us.”).
218 Id. at 2222 (majority opinion).
219 Id. In fact, the actual ruling was even narrower, applying only to historical records
exceeding more than seven days. Id. at 2217 n.3.
220 Id. at 2220.
221 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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“resist” government requests in their official privacy policies, 222 but
without strong legal protections, the only thing standing between the
government and access to increasingly detailed personal information
is a for-profit company.
Now, consumers generally rely on the market to encourage
companies to prioritize consumer privacy. However, as technology
becomes more integrated in our lives and homes, the opportunity for
abuse becomes greater. Without adequate constitutional protections
and a clear third-party standard informing both government
investigators and private companies of the proper boundaries of the
Fourth Amendment, if the market for privacy lags behind the market
for government cooperation, corporate priorities can shift. 223 The
current third-party doctrine offers no clear impediment to expanding
the use of these tools for increased surveillance, and we should not wait
for the problem to move from science fiction to scientific fact before
we find solutions.
III.

SOLVING THE THIRD-PARTY DILEMMA: RETURNING TO KATZ

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship aims to find a
balance between privacy and security. 224 The third-party doctrine is an
important limit on the reach of the Fourth Amendment: without it, the
state would be forced to ignore information in the public domain. 225
It is in the best interest of society for government investigators to be
able to investigate crime. For instance, Miller is instrumental in
financial fraud investigations, as information shared with banks is
viewed as unprotected by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 226 More generally, providing criminals with a technological

222 Peter Aldhous, This Genealogy Database Helped Solve Dozens of Crimes. But Its New
Privacy Rules Will Restrict Access by Cops, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 19, 2019), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/this-genealogy-database-helped-solvedozens-of-crimes-but [https://perma.cc/D5SL-TUYH].
223 For example, GEDmatch previously had a strong opt-in policy for use of genetic
information by police; it was recently purchased by a company that provides DNA
sequencing information to crime labs. Jennifer Lynch, Genetic Genealogy Company GEDmatch
Acquired by Company with Ties to FBI & Law Enforcement—Why You Should Be Worried, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/geneticgenealogy-company-gedmatch-acquired-company-ties-fbi-law-enforcement-why [https://
perma.cc/HQ8V-BUQV].
224 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
354 (1974); Kerr, supra note 31, at 574.
225 See supra Part I.
226 Jeremy Ciarabellini, Cryptocurrencies’ Revolt Against the BSA: Why the Supreme Court
Should Hold that the Bank Secrecy Act Violates the Fourth Amendment, 10 SEATTLE J. TECH. ENV’T
& INNOVATION L. 135, 138, 147 (2020) (arguing that Miller and the Supreme Court’s third-
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cloak of invisibility in an age where most communication is done
online would severely hamper the ability of police and government
agents to do their jobs. 227 However, we are a long way from spike bugs
and radio transmitters: third parties sit in our living rooms and record
our families’ conversations. 228 There is almost nothing in our lives that
third parties do not touch. 229 Courts struggled to find that securityprivacy balance when government investigators merely retrieved dialed
phone numbers; 230 as more and more third parties enter our homes,
lives, and bodies, maintaining that balance becomes even more
treacherous. The Court’s current construction tilts too heavily in favor
of security over privacy; in the digital age, the third-party doctrine has
become one of the biggest threats to the privacy-security balance.
But the doctrine can be fixed. In this Section, we examine the
competing judicial and academic solutions to the third-party doctrine
conundrum, and then explain why giving substantive meaning to the
“knowing[] expos[ure] to the public” test articulated in Katz would
restore balance between privacy and security. By combining a knowledge requirement with an evaluation of the nature of the third-party,
this test limits the scope of the doctrine while at the same time
providing government investigators—and reviewing courts—a clear,
ex ante standard to apply.
A. Too Many Cooks: The Supreme Court’s Solutions
After years of skirting around the inherent problems with the
modern application of the third-party doctrine, 231 the Supreme Court
faced the issue directly in 2018, in Carpenter v. United States. 232
Suspecting Mr. Carpenter in a series of robberies, police requested
access to his CSLI from his cellular service provider. CSLI records are
created when a cell phone moves into the vicinity of a nearby cell
tower. Under a strict application of the third-party doctrine, CSLI is a
third-party business record, unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.

party doctrine application is wrong, but that the current articulation insulates the Bank
Secrecy Act from constitutional challenge).
227 See generally Tonja Jacobi & Jonah Kind, Criminal Innovation and the Warrant
Requirement: Reconsidering the Rights-Police Efficiency Trade-off, 56 WM & MARY L. REV. 759
(2015) (describing the need for law enforcement agencies to innovate in response to
criminal innovation).
228 Fowler, supra note 164.
229 See examples supra Part II.
230 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737–38 (1979).
231 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Riley
v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (opining on the importance of cell phones to our
daily lives).
232 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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However, the government acquired and analyzed 127 days’ worth of
CSLI, effectively tracking Carpenter for over four months. 233 Carpenter
brought to a head the risk that a strict following of the categorical
third-party sharing rule espoused in Smith and Miller could lead to
essentially ubiquitous and comprehensive warrantless surveillance.
Many hoped that the Court would use Carpenter to provide clarity
on the state of the doctrine; many were disappointed. 234 The Court
instead dodged the difficult question and fudged a simple solution,
simultaneously affirming the categorical Smith-Miller third-party
doctrine but exempting weeks’ worth of highly specific location
tracking. 235 What resulted was an admittedly narrow holding that
endorsed a categorical rule with ad hoc exemptions determined by
their “uniqueness.”236 This approach amounts to a judicial whack-amole that provides little surety to citizens currently living with thirdparties recording conversations in their living rooms, and even less
guidance to government investigators hoping to listen to those
recordings.
The majority opinion in Carpenter acknowledges the new digital
reality: technology has changed since Smith was decided in 1979, and
the amount of information shared through phones and third parties
dwarfs the dialed phone numbers at issue in that case. 237 Yet, rather
than rethink its problematic categorical articulation of the doctrine,
the majority upheld both Smith and Miller, choosing simply to not apply
those cases to the “unique” facts at issue. 238 However, these facts are
not unique—there are countless devices and applications that provide
233 Id. at 2212–13.
234 Christopher C. Fonzone, Kate Heinzelman & Michael R. Roberts, Carpenter and
Everything After: The Supreme Court Nudges the Fourth Amendment into the Information Age, 58
INFRASTRUCTURE 3, 3 (2019) (“Would it hold that the Amendment offers no protection to
the digital tracks that are a necessary byproduct of the Information Age? Or would it reverse
a doctrine that law enforcement officials have relied on for two generations? In fact, the
Court appeared to do neither.”); Elizabeth De Armond, Tactful Inattention: Erving Goffman,
Privacy in the Digital Age, and the Virtue of Averting One’s Eyes, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 283, 296
(2018) (“Nonetheless, the reach of Carpenter is narrow for the moment . . . .”); Orin Kerr,
Understanding the Supreme Court’s Carpenter Decision, LAWFARE BLOG (June 22, 2018, 1:18
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-supreme-courts-carpenter-decision
[https://perma.cc/8CPF-LKH2] (writing that the third-party doctrine lives, but with an
equilibrium adjustment cap).
235 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. Although some have argued that Carpenter might do
more work than its language indicates—see Kerr, supra note 234—without a formal test,
individuals must rely on the whims of lower courts interpreting vague language.
236 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
237 Id. (“After all, when Smith was decided in 1979, few could have imagined a society
in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying to the wireless carrier not just
dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s movements.”).
238 Id.
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far more information than CSLI: for instance, there are watches that
keep track not only of a person’s location, but of the wearer’s heart
rate, calorie count, step count, and sleep cycles. 239 Investigators and
lower courts must now analogize a Ring doorbell to Carpenter’s CSLI
dumps, or differentiate a simple Fitbit step counter from those
comprehensive health monitor watches, and numerous other
variations of such devices, in order to determine if they are subject to
the warrant requirement. Carpenter did limit the third-party doctrine,
but it left open the questions of when, where, and how much.
The four individual dissenting opinions in Carpenter are worth
analyzing, as they are representative of the debate surrounding the
third-party doctrine and indicative of the doctrine’s divisiveness.
Justice Kennedy’s logic is simple: CSLI is a routine business record
owned by the phone company that the government “has a lawful right
to obtain by compulsory process” under Miller and Smith. 240 He
criticizes the majority opinion’s shift from a categorical distinction to
a balancing test that weighs privacy interests against the fact of thirdparty disclosure. 241 And, in a particularly important point directly
addressing the privacy-security balance, Justice Kennedy writes that
CSLI is “uniquely suited” to linking individual perpetrators with
criminal acts. 242 In doing so, he includes usefulness to government
investigators as a factor in his analysis. Justice Kennedy downplays the
risk to privacy, arguing that CSLI is not particularly accurate and does
not pose a substantial risk. 243
Although this opinion is consistent with precedent, it overvalues
security at the expense of privacy. Justice Kennedy provides little
analysis of how this categorical view would address a more detailed
tracking system, or third-party activity in the home. Could police
warrantlessly track where you are in your home because you send that
information to your smart thermostat? Could they subpoena video
from inside your home because you share that with your security
system company? Is your sleep cycle fair game simply because it is
stored on a third-party cloud hosting service? And Justice Kennedy
barely acknowledges customer knowledge, simply assuming it is
reasonable for cell phone owners to expect information collected by
the phone company will be used for “a variety of business and

239 See, e.g., Forerunner® 735XT, GARMIN, https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/p
/541225 [https://perma.cc/7LHC-GD5X].
240 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223–24 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 2232 (“Miller and Smith do not establish the kind of category-by-category
balancing the Court today prescribes.”).
242 Id. at 2226.
243 Id. at 2233.
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commercial purposes.”244 Justice Kennedy treats the main points of
analysis in a third-party doctrine question as (1) whether the
information is sold to third parties and (2) whether it is helpful to
police; under this analysis, the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment
become nothing more than a paper tiger. While Justice Kennedy’s
opinion is consistent with prior opinions, it would shift the Fourth
Amendment balance dangerously towards security and away from
privacy, putting everything from Alexa recordings to email at risk of
warrantless search.
Justices Alito and Thomas signed on to Justice Kennedy’s dissent,
but Justice Alito also wrote separately to address a central quandary
with the majority’s opinion: either the holding applies broadly, and is
better able to respond to changing technology while greatly restricting
the third-party doctrine, or it applies in an ad hoc way, leaving the
doctrine “subject to all sorts of qualifications and limitations that have
not yet been discovered.” 245 But ironically, Justice Alito then creates
his own exception, arguing that the Fourth Amendment should not
apply to subpoenas and compelled production. According to Justice
Alito, a subpoena should not be held to the same standard as a search,
as the risks of government overreach are simply not present when
government agents are not doing the searching, 246 and doing so
“would cripple the work of courts in civil and criminal cases alike.”247
So Justice Alito’s solution actually has two significant disadvantages: he
strays from precedent to carve out an entirely new exception for
Fourth Amendment searches for subpoenaed information, while
criticizing the majority for the same thing, and at the same time
shifting the balance even more sharply towards security and away from
privacy.
Justice Thomas largely agreed with Justice Alito, writing
individually to argue Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy is neither
based in history nor easily applied, and, as such, should be
overturned. 248 Justice Thomas would prefer the Court return
exclusively to Olmstead’s trespass model, requiring a physical trespass
before the Fourth Amendment is triggered. 249 This position likely also
favors security over privacy, for the reasons detailed below regarding
Justice Gorsuch’s similar solution. It also has the disadvantage of being
inconsistent with prior precedent: although Olmstead was given new life
in Jones, the Court made it clear that the Fourth Amendment was
244
245
246
247
248
249

Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2250–51.
Id. at 2252.
Id. at 2243–46 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2236–37, 2240.
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governed by trespass and the reasonable expectation of privacy, not
one or the other. 250
In contrast to the other dissenting opinions, Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent is far more concerned with the dangers to privacy posed by the
third-party doctrine in the modern age. As he writes, “Can the
government demand a copy of all your e-mails from Google or
Microsoft without implicating your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it
secure your DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause?
Smith and Miller say yes it can . . . .” 251 Acknowledging the risks that a
categorical third-party doctrine pose in the modern age, Justice
Gorsuch writes that if the third-party doctrine is “supposed to
represent a normative assessment of when a person should expect
privacy, the notion that the answer might be ‘never’ seems a pretty
unattractive societal prescription.” 252 Yet Justice Gorsuch rejects a
balancing test like the one proposed by the majority, arguing that it
offers little guidance to lower courts beyond “judicial intuition[].” 253
Despite being far more explicitly concerned about the important
privacy problems raised in this Article than Justice Thomas, 254 Justice
Gorsuch comes to largely the same conclusion: his solution is to scrap
the third-party doctrine and Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy
test entirely, returning to a property-based approach that would rest
Fourth Amendment protection on a party’s ownership rights over a
particular item or information. 255
By emphasizing property rights, Justice Gorsuch’s solution
ostensibly promotes privacy over security. Yet, by eliminating the thirdparty doctrine and Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test, his
solution would rely heavily on Congress and the states to create
particular and actionable property interests in digital information. 256
Given the slow, deliberative nature of state and federal legislative
bodies, it is questionable whether they can adequately respond to
rapidly changing technological trends and shared data. Further, it is
unclear how courts should respond when Congress articulates a
limited property right, for example, when Congress requires only a
250 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).
251 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 2263 (citing William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the
Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1872 (2016)).
253 Id. at 2264.
254 Yet, unlike Justice Thomas’s more limited view of property, Justice Gorsuch would
allow property to be defined by anything—tangible or intangible—in which the state or
federal legislature has conferred a property right. Id. at 2268–72.
255 Id. at 2268 (arguing that one solution to determining Fourth Amendment
violations is to look to positive legal rights to determine whether a property interest exists—
and was violated—in the searched or seized item).
256 Id.
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subpoena or written request to access data. Does this trigger an
overriding warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment, or can
Congress both dictate what is property and the constitutional
response? As such, despite his sensitivity to the dangers to privacy
raised in the digital age, without state intervention, Justice Gorsuch’s
solution, too, ultimately errs in favor of security over privacy.
The Carpenter majority opinion had its categorical cake and ate its
balancing test, too. By affirming Miller and Smith while simultaneously
limiting them based on the uniqueness of CSLI, the Court transformed
the clunky categorical approach to the third-party doctrine into a new
pseudocategorical approach that becomes a balancing test at some
unspecified level of informational detail. 257 This raises more questions
than it answers. The Court says seven days of CSLI are too much, but
what about three? 258 What if the issue is not CSLI but rather
information gathered from a maps app that records your movements
to suggest better routes? The third-party doctrine applies until the
situation becomes unique, so people wondering if this means their
Alexa is an undercover agent must wait until the Court addresses
Alexas. The dissenting opinions in Carpenter all end up worsening the
problem, expanding state power and restricting privacy rights to
varying degrees. Seemingly, then, waiting for a solution to the thirdparty problem to come from the Supreme Court may be in vain. As
such, we now consider potential solutions proposed by others.
B. The Goldilocks Zone of Privacy: Academic Solutions
Many academics criticize the third-party doctrine, but their
solutions are as varied, and arguably just as muddled, as the Court’s.
The various viewpoints can be catalogued into three dominant
proposals of how to restore the balance between privacy and security:
first, that the third-party doctrine, while flawed, should be left as-is;
second, that the third-party doctrine should be eliminated; and third,
that the Katzian third-party standard should be replaced by a variety of
tests, from multipart, bright line rules 259 to a reasonable suspicion
standard similar to that articulated in Terry v. Ohio. 260 Each approach
has drawbacks: the first, like the dissents in Carpenter, fails to properly
recognize the downside of prioritizing privacy over security; the second

257 Id. at 2219 (majority opinion).
258 Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
259 H. Brian Holland, A Third-Party Doctrine for Digital Metadata, 41 CARDOZO L. REV.
1549, 1588–99 (2020); Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth
Amendment Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1942–45 (2017).
260 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (establishing reasonable suspicion, a lower
threshold than probable cause, for a short, temporary detainment by police).
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goes too far in the other direction, failing to ensure the state can
engage in investigations of activities, even those occurring in public;
and the third has pragmatic problems in operation.
A paradigmatic example of the first proposed solution—that the
third-party doctrine should remain largely unchanged—is provided by
Professor Orin Kerr. 261 Kerr argues that the third-party doctrine both
provides ex ante clarity for government investigators and reviewing
courts and ensures that criminals cannot take advantage of changing
technologies to hide their activities—what Kerr calls “substitution
effect[s].” 262 He suggests that the Court’s third-party doctrine jurisprudence can be better understood as a subset of the consent doctrine, as
it is built around the notion that “[t]hird-party disclosure eliminates
privacy because the target voluntarily consents to the disclosure.” 263
This argument is problematic for four important reasons.
First, Kerr’s defense shifts the balance of the Fourth Amendment
dramatically towards security and away from privacy by essentially
preferring that one guilty person be caught than a hundred innocent
people have privacy in their digital information. 264 Kerr argues that
the third-party doctrine’s categorical rule is beneficial because it keeps
criminals from substituting public, easily investigable acts with private
acts hidden with technology. 265 While it is true that criminals might
use technology to hide their illegal activities, those same technologies
are often used by many more people not engaged in criminal
activity. 266 If a criminal uses Google to send an email to a coconspirator rather than talk in an alley, does that mean the police
should have warrantless access to all Gmail accounts? The risk of
negative externalities—mainly deterring innocent conduct for fear of
government investigation—makes this defense of the third-party
doctrine as constructed particularly troublesome.
Second, it is unclear how significant this substitution risk really is.
Some crimes, such as white-collar fraud or child-rape pornography,
261 Kerr, supra note 31, at 564.
262 Id. at 564–65.
263 Id. at 588 (“So long as a person knows that they are disclosing information to a third
party, their choice to do so is voluntary and the consent valid.”).
264 This is a reversal of the famous maxim that “it is better that a few criminals escape
than that the privacies of life of all the people be exposed to the agents of the government.”
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 n.12 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
265 Kerr, supra note 31, at 575–77.
266 Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein
and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1241 (2009) (“[B]ecause the technologies left
exposed by third-party doctrine are not exclusively deployed for illicit purposes, failing to
protect them generates negative externalities (by dissuading innocent, desirable
conduct) . . . .”); Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third
Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 45 (2011).
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often use technology as an indispensable element of the crime, but
others, like murder, drunk driving, disorderly conduct, and larceny,
might be able to be planned online, but there is no way to substitute
the public criminal act for a private act cloaked in technology. 267 In
reality, the third-party doctrine does not provide a bulwark against
savvy criminals, but rather puts an enormous amount of private
information at risk in order to better investigate a particular subset of
private criminal activity. 268 The Fourth Amendment does not vary its
protection based on the public or private nature of the criminal
investigation—this is clear in the text of the Amendment, and in Katz’s
famous holding that protection follows people, not places. 269 As such,
rationalizing the third-party doctrine on substitution grounds puts
significant amounts of private information at risk in the hopes that
marginal security gains may be met.
Third, providing ex ante clarity to investigators is not a sufficient
reason to allow for an overbroad third-party doctrine. Just as applying
the death penalty to prevent parking violations would be effective,
abolishing all privacy rights would provide such ex ante clarity, but
both cases would constitute over-deterrence, making the cost to society
too high. 270 The value of ex ante clarity must be weighed against the
need for privacy, and the need for certainty for police officers cannot
be used as a cudgel to beat back privacy rights or mask the cost of such
investigative techniques. Furthermore, such clarity does not depend
on the current formulation of the categorical third-party rule: as we
show below, it can also be found by giving structure to the Katz test of
whether the information was knowingly shared with the public,
relieving investigators of the need to grapple with the difficulties of
determining the “information history” of something shared with a
third party.
Fourth, placing the third-party doctrine within the doctrine of
consent is problematic. Kerr—and frequently the Court—assume
consent from the mere act of sharing information with another. 271 Yet
knowledge of a risk is not the same as assuming the risk. If it was, the
government could simply give notice of any Orwellian investigatory
technique, and by remaining in the country, we would be deemed to

267 Murphy, supra note 266, at 1243.
268 Id. at 1243–44.
269 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
270 On the social costs of over-deterrence, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 410 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[T]he strict sanctioning rule does not
achieve the first-best outcome because it leads to the imposition of costly sanctions.”).
271 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 742 (1979).
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have consented to that risk. This is obviously at odds with the Fourth
Amendment itself and would put the authority of determining the
bounds of the Fourth Amendment in the hands of the very party the
Amendment seeks to confine. 272
The second proposed solution—that the third-party doctrine
needs to be radically transformed—has been made by many scholars,
explicitly or implicitly, 273 who typically argue that the third-party
doctrine is too dangerous and should be eliminated. 274 To these
scholars, the doctrine is incompatible with the digital age: a third-party
doctrine that might have worked when calls were made in phone
booths simply cannot work when calls are made from a device that
coordinates hundreds of third parties to act as GPS trackers, bank
tellers, call operators, cameras, personal computers, home security
monitors, and so much more. 275 This fear is legitimate and widely
acknowledged—while the Court has not offered workable solutions, it
has acknowledged the risks to allowing warrantless government access
to everything that third-party technology has to offer. 276
Arguing for the elimination of the third-party rule is
understandable given the risks imposed by a categorical sharing rule.
272 As the Court recognized in Smith’s famous footnote: “[W]here an individual’s
subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no
meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.”
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5.
273 For instance, Professor Sherry Colb has argued that consent should be viewed as
requiring voluntary, explicit consent, in which case the third-party doctrine is effectively
eliminated. Colb, supra note 101, at 123 (“First, it would represent an open
acknowledgement that ‘knowing exposure’ only occurs when there has been some explicit
or tacit consent to public observation, and not simply the taking of a risk or the limited
exposure of what is then further disseminated.”).
274 See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting
Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 1024–26
(2007); Daniel Solove, 10 Reasons Why the Third Party Doctrine Should be Overruled in Carpenter
v. US, TEACHPRIVACY (Nov. 28, 2017), https://teachprivacy.com/carpenter-v-us-10-reasonsfourth-amendment-third-party-doctrine-overruled/
[https://perma.cc/UC4K-UHPS];
Andrew J. DeFilippis, Note, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1089 (2006).
275 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for
Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005) (“The third party doctrine presents
one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital age.”).
276 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the broad and
unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic
surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards”); see also
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Even
our most private documents—those that, in other eras, we would have locked safely in a
desk drawer or destroyed—now reside on third party servers. Smith and Miller teach that
the police can review all of this material, on the theory that no one reasonably expects any
of it will be kept private. But no one believes that, if they ever did.”).
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However, such drastic reform would significantly hamper certain
valuable investigations, especially those, like that of white-collar crimes,
in which it is particularly hard to generate individualized suspicion
without personal information held by third parties. 277 White-collar
crime has a massive effect on the financial well-being of millions of
Americans—it is estimated to account for between $300 and $600
billion annually. 278 Yet white-collar crime largely involves tools and
mechanisms legally used by millions of people. 279 What makes whitecollar crime unlawful is that illegal acts often intermingle with legal
acts, differentiated only by their “purpose and intent.” 280 This makes
investigating white-collar crime particularly difficult, as white-collar
crimes are difficult to report for a number of reasons. 281 These crimes
are often very technical and, because of their complexity and use of
legal tools and techniques, victims often do not even know that they
were victimized. 282 Investigators must gather significant amounts of
information—often personal financial information—to search for
patterns that suggest illegality. 283 Both the Court and Congress have
recognized these challenges in ruling bank records accessible without
a warrant. 284
Although Kerr’s fear of a substitution effect is overdrawn, it is true
that there exist countless ways for criminals to use third parties to
facilitate or obfuscate their actions. In the 2014 Playpen cases,
hundreds of people were convicted of downloading child-rape
pornography using Tor browsers to disguise their IP addresses. 285 In a

277 John S. Applegate, The Business Papers Rule: Personal Privacy and White Collar Crime,
16 AKRON L. REV. 189, 194 (1982).
278 Bruce Kennedy, Why White Collar Criminals Often Get Away, CBS NEWS (May 11,
2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/getting-away-with-white-collar-crime/ [https://
perma.cc/8T4T-4RNQ].
279 Applegate, supra note 277, at 192.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 194.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 195.
284 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (“The lack of any legitimate
expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by
Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act . . . because they ‘have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings.’” (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (1976)); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630,
92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (1982)). Bank records kept pursuant
to the Bank Secrecy Act may only be obtained by customer consent, subpoena, search
warrant, or “formal written request,” barring a narrowly defined emergency or exigent
circumstance. 92 Stat. at 3698.
285 The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://
www.eff.org/pages/playpen-cases-frequently-asked-questions#whathappened
[https://
perma.cc/H78B-R3G5].
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massive national and international raid, the government installed
malware that searched the suspects’ computers for their actual IP
addresses, which were later used to gather evidence of an extensive
child-rape pornography ring. 286 Services like Tor browsing have made
committing criminal acts online, like sharing child-rape pornography,
much more difficult to investigate. Simply eliminating the third-party
doctrine would swing too far away from security, hamstringing
investigations of crimes that can be hidden by legal third-party tools
yet are extremely damaging to society. Privacy is not the only value
that must be weighed in Fourth Amendment analysis.
The final major approach that scholars have put forward proposes
various compromise positions, incorporating everything from
multipart bright line tests 287 to a Terry-style reasonable suspicion
standard as a middle ground between eliminating the third-party
doctrine and embracing a categorical third-party rule. 288 These
solutions seek to bridge the gap between a categorical rule and an ad
hoc application in a way that police and courts are familiar with:
determining whether there was reasonable suspicion for the search,
and whether the search was carried out in reasonable scope. 289
We focus on the reasonable suspicion solution, as it attempts to
provide a fully ad hoc judicial solution to the third-party quandary
outside of the traditional Katzian framework. There are three problems with this solution. First, reasonable suspicion is a notoriously
lenient standard for police to meet, as many critics have noted:
“[C]ourts have interpreted the ‘totality of the circumstances’ broadly,
thus expanding the scope of what constitutes an acceptable Terry
stop.” 290 Even some courts agree with this characterization: “[The
doctrine has] expanded beyond [its] original contours, in order to
permit reasonable police action when probable cause is arguably
lacking.”291 Replacing a categorical rule with any sort of limiting doctrine would seemingly restrict the power of government agents, but
this restriction is likely to turn out to be illusory. As technology
becomes more and more integrated into people’s daily lives, and thus
more central to an increasing number of criminal investigations, a

286 Id. The warrant was ultimately invalidated as exceeding jurisdictional scope, but
the evidence was not suppressed as a reasonable officer would have thought the warrant was
valid. United States v. Taylor, 935 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied.
287 See, e.g., Holland, supra note 259, at 1588–99.
288 Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100
MINN. L. REV. 985, 987 (2016).
289 Id. at 1036.
290 Rachel Karen Laser, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on Refusals to Support Terry Stops,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1995).
291 United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990).
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reasonable suspicion standard will not provide the bulwark against
abuse that is necessary in the modern age.
Second, that lenient standard was justified because Terry stops and
frisks are highly constrained. 292 Terry stops require only reasonable
articulable suspicion because they are less intrusive than searches, and
because typically a swift response is required to a suspicion raised by
on-the-spot observation, which is thus unforeseeable. 293 Accordingly,
reasonableness is only met if the stop or frisk is carefully proscribed in
both time and content. 294 In contrast, the third-party doctrine has
been applied to detailed, comprehensive analysis of bank records,
emails, etc.—clearly not meeting the limited intrusion requirement of
Terry. Furthermore, the third-party doctrine is not normally tied to the
need for swift action: Carpenter is the only case to have suggested that
there is any time constraint applicable, and that was only in relation to
a very specific exception—historical CSLI data spanning more than
seven days’ duration—not in any way linked to the need for immediacy
of action.
Third, how Terry-style analysis would apply beyond the
constrained nature of stops and frisks is highly uncertain. Supporters
of this view argue that this would provide ex ante clarity for police
officers and government agents, all of whom know how to apply
reasonable suspicion analyses. However, applying this approach beyond stop-and-frisk to full searches would likely turn the third-party
doctrine into a reasonableness Rorschach blot. 295 What simple, easily
applied standard would apply to bank records, phone GPS data, Alexa
recordings, Fitbit health information, and so on? Any reasonable
suspicion standard that worked to bridge that contextual divide would
end up being so vague as to be nearly useless. Furthermore, it would
need to answer not only what can be searched, but how extensively,
which opens up a fresh batch of distinctions that Terry has never had
to answer. For example, evaluating what is a reasonable scope for a
search of a person’s phone 296 and a person’s CSLI data 297 is
dramatically different. What ex ante clarity is there when officers must
compare a Facebook private message to a Nest thermostat? A simple

292 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
293 Id. at 20.
294 Id. at 29 (“The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the
protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in
scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer.”).
295 Amsterdam, supra note 224, at 393.
296 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014).
297 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).

NDL207_JACOBI_STONECIPHER_02_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

3/23/2022 4:03 PM

A SOLUTION FOR THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

873

reasonableness inquiry leaves far too much room for judicial
interpretation and far too little clarity for acting agents.
While many scholars have come to agree that the third-party
doctrine is highly problematic, there is no consensus on how to resolve
the difficulty of balancing security and privacy in the third-party
doctrine. Each of the broad categories of solutions discussed here
raise as many problems as they solve. In the next Section, we provide
an alternative that sidesteps the problems of both extremes, discussed
here, and avoids creating a chasm of ambiguity and discretion, which
the more moderate solutions typically create.
C. The Solution: Reinvigorating Katz’s Two-Part Test
The third-party doctrine was established during the age of landline telephones and pocket radio transmitters. A categorical rule
based around sharing information was more palatable when the most
a person would likely share were numbers dialed 298 or deposit slips. 299
But in our information-sharing age, we cannot permit such a
dramatically over-inclusive rule that risks exposing highly sensitive
information to government surveillance. And doing so is not even
required by the logic of the underlying doctrine: the cases that
established the categorical third-party doctrine did so by ignoring the
language and facts of Katz.
Our solution retains much of the ex ante clarity of a categorical
rule while providing enough analytical flexibility to avoid overbreadth,
all while being rooted in both the language and spirit of Katz.
According to Katz, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.” 300 Thus, information (1) knowingly exposed (2) to the
public ought to be excluded from Fourth Amendment protection.
The existing third-party doctrine glosses over both these elements.
Rather than simply excluding from Fourth Amendment protection
everything that has been shared, or asking courts and police to make
complicated, ad hoc reasonableness inquiries, we can rigorously
operationalize this two-part test by focusing on the nature of the
recipient and the knowledge of the sharer.

298 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
299 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
300 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (first citing Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); and then citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
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1. Knowingly Exposes
Miller and Smith base their rule on the simplistic formalism that if
a person shares information, that information is compellable by the
government precisely and only because it was shared. But that is
inconsistent with the facts of Katz. In Katz, the very case that birthed
the third-party doctrine, Mr. Katz was on the phone with another
person, actively sharing information, yet that communication retained
its Fourth Amendment protection. 301 A standard higher than simple
sharing is implied by the facts alone.
The difference between “knowingly exposes” as used in Katz
versus Miller and Smith is that in Katz, this “knowingly” element had
bite, not just window dressing. It is clear from the text of Katz that
“knowingly” was meant to have substantive meaning:
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from
which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass,
so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if
he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he
entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited
ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his
calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an
individual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a
call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. 302

The Katz Court is essentially saying that even though Katz knew
that it was possible to be seen in a glass phone booth, a reasonable
person would not expect that to translate into him having made his
externally inaudible speech public. In the same way, when a person
sends an email, they may know that they are using a platform such as
Gmail, but the reasonable person would not expect that to translate
into having no privacy in the correspondence, because they have not
knowingly made the content public, even though they have knowingly
transmitted through a third party. The exposure must be knowing, not
presumed simply from having used a potentially unavoidable conduit,
be it a landline telephone or an email provider.
The Court in Katz is thus using “knowingly expose[]” to capture
the concept of making an informed choice to convey information to a
third party. If Mr. Katz knowing that a person could be standing close
301 Id. at 359.
302 Id. at 352 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920); then citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); and then citing
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)).
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to the phone booth and overhear his conversation is not enough to
annihilate his expectation of privacy, then the Court clearly required
something more than simple knowledge of the possibility of exposure
occurring to undermine the expectation of privacy. In the same way,
simple awareness that an ISP is involved in the email transmission
process similarly cannot obliterate an expectation of privacy in one’s
email. The Katz Court stressed the significance of Mr. Katz shutting
the door and paying the toll because in doing so Mr. Katz was evincing
his choice not to convey the information to any person other than his
conversation partner.
Interestingly, it is not only Katz that makes this implication clear.
In Smith, the Court explicitly stated that pure knowledge cannot be
enough:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz’ twopronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth
Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals
thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of
privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. . . . where
individual’s subjective expectations had been “conditioned” by
influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms,
those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful
role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection was. 303

Thus, even the Smith Court is acknowledging that simple knowledge
can be inadequate.
But importantly, the Katz Court did not merely refer to
“knowingly” on its own, it referred to “knowingly expos[ing].”304
Exposure is an act—an active verb. The Court since Katz has used the
term in a very passive way, in terms of knowledge of the possibility of
exposure occurring. The Katz Court, in contrast, required a positive
action by the person potentially losing their expectation of privacy—
that is, a voluntary act on their part.
For this reason, the Court’s choice to eventually turn to
voluntariness language made sense: choice necessitates positive action,
not simply a state of knowledge. However, where Smith and Miller went
wrong is, first, in refusing to see that choice implies there must be an
alternative option, and second, in jettisoning the knowledge
requirement in favor of voluntariness—as we have seen, voluntariness
of exposure is inadequate also. By contrast, the way that Katz conceives
303 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5.
304 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (first citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966);
and then citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
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of knowingly exposing incorporates both knowledge and
voluntariness. The Katz Court used “knowing[] expos[ure]” to mean
that a person must know that their actions are making their
information no longer private and have an actual choice to avoid such
exposure, yet make the decision to so act anyway. In Smith and Miller,
even if the defendants knew the phone company and the bank kept
their records, they had no choice but to use the phone or bank. Katz
requires both knowledge and voluntariness in the face of that
knowledge. It is this way in which “knowingly expose[]” can be given
back its bite. And that can occur using terms that are familiar to
courts—both knowledge and voluntariness are well-known concepts.
Reinvigorated in this way, a Katzian “knowingly expose[d]”
component appropriately protects citizens against illicit government
surveillance and intrusion, given the ubiquitous sharing that occurs
daily. Importantly, it would address situations where the sharing
occurs unbeknownst to a reasonable consumer. Snapchat sells itself as
an app that allows users to send pictures and messages to other users
and have those messages delete themselves shortly after being
shared. 305 Yet users’ snaps are not literally deleted—instead, they are
stored on the recipient’s device in an unmapped but accessible form. 306
To the surprise of millions of Snapchat users, it was subsequently
revealed that snaps are also kept in a central database accessible by two
high-level Snapchat employees. 307 Under Smith, a court would not be
out of line to assume that users knew Snapchat had to store snaps for
business purposes. Under a reinvigorated Katzian knowingly exposed
prong, however, given the publicly portrayed nature of Snapchat, an
applying court would easily conclude that Snapchat’s likely users would
not have read such fine print and would have relied instead on
Snapchat’s advertised purpose of providing a private forum, and thus
any public exposure was not knowing.
This analysis also provides a better means of deciding Carpenter, as
there was likely nothing that would have indicated to Carpenter or a
reasonable cell phone owner that their CSLI was going to be recorded
and stored indefinitely by their cell phone provider. As such, there is

305 Snapchat Support, When Does Snapchat Delete Snaps and Chats?, SNAPCHAT, https://
support.snapchat.com/en-US/article/when-are-snaps-chats-deleted
[https://perma.cc
/A9RF-CLNX] (“Delete is our default.”).
306 Alyson Shontell, Actually, Snapchat Doesn’t Delete Your Private Pictures and Someone
Found a Way to Resurface Them, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2013), https://
www.businessinsider.com/snapchat-doesnt-delete-your-private-pictures-2013-5
[https://
perma.cc/WLG7-FA88].
307 William Stanton, Can Snapchat Employees See Your Snaps?, ALPHR (Apr. 28, 2019),
https://www.alphr.com/snapchat-employees-see-your-snaps/
[https://perma.cc/JY58XN8V].
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no need for the Court to craft an exception for cell phone location
information, with all of the caveats and qualifications that involved,
and all of the unknown implications for future applications that
decision created. Instead, under our approach—which is really the
Katz Court’s approach—courts can look at contracts and terms of
service for guidance on what reasonable users expect.
Giving meaning to the “knowingly expose[d]” component in this
way, by equating it with an informed choice, solves the problem of
inferring knowledge from an act that is in essence forced upon a
person. In Miller, even as the Court stressed voluntariness over
knowledge, voluntary action was assumed despite the fact that most
people need bank accounts to have jobs, homes, utilities, and other life
necessities. 308 The majority in Miller determined that “[a]ll of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips,
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.” 309 Yet
the Court did not address the dissent’s argument that owning and
operating a bank account cannot be considered voluntary if it is
required to function in society. If that was the case, advancing
technology could force whole swaths of information out of the Fourth
Amendment’s orbit with no inquiry into whether or not an individual
can ever show an attempt to protect their reasonable expectation of
privacy.
The Court hinted at this kind of analysis in Riley, arguing that cell
phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy.” 310 However, that case concerned a search incident to arrest; when the same issue arose as applied
to the third-party doctrine, in Carpenter, the Court faced the exact same
question regarding the voluntariness of owning a cell phone, as well as
the related question of whether a reasonable cell phone owner
understood that CSLI was gathered and stored in the first place.
Instead, the Court focused on the amount of information that could
be gleaned from CSLI. 311 This was a missed opportunity to give
guidance on how “knowingly exposes” meaningfully applies in thirdparty doctrine analysis.
Despite the importance of the knowledge component in Katz, the
Court frequently assumes knowledge with little analysis. In Smith, the
Court’s analysis of this component is filled with assumptions and
logical leaps. For example, “[a]ll telephone users realize that they
308
309
310
311

Ciarabellini, supra note 226, at 138.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
Id. at 395–96.
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must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is
through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are
completed.” 312 Yet the opinion later acknowledges that, even by 1979,
this was done automatically, without human input. 313 Based on a halfpage of these assumptions, the majority then assumes that this
translates to knowledge: “it is too much to believe that telephone
subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general
expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”314
Knowledge was explored even less rigorously in Miller; the majority
simply stated that Miller’s financial statements and “deposit slips . . .
are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be
used in commercial transactions . . . exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course of business,” without addressing whether Miller or a
reasonable banking services consumer would understand that the act
of depositing a check would render it no longer a private paper. 315
Even after Miller, surveyed subjects considered that the government
“perusing bank records” without a warrant would rank at 71.60 on a
0–100 rating of intrusiveness, 316 suggesting the unsoundness of the
Court simply surmising knowledge and expectations, rather than
looking to contractual terms and other like indicia of actual consumer
understandings.
Some scholars attempt to address this concern by arguing that the
Court should not equate knowing exposure with creating a risk of
exposure. 317 As Professor Sherry Colb queries, if you whisper something in someone’s ear and a passerby leans in to hear, have you really
“exposed” that information, or has the passerby exposed it for you by
breaking social norms? 318 But the problem with relying on a
distinction between knowing exposure and risk of exposure is that this
approach runs afoul of the plain view comparison cited in support for
the knowing exposure doctrine in Katz. 319 One can knowingly expose
312 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
313 Id. at 744.
314 Id. at 743.
315 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
316 Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738 (1993).
317 Colb, supra note 101, at 122.
318 Id. at 126.
319 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1976) (first citing Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); and then citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927))
(“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210
(1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (finding enough probable cause for
a search, given the meeting in question took place in plain view).
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without taking any affirmative action. For instance, if a person leaves
a confession to a murder taped to their refrigerator, and the only way
to see it is to walk up to their fence, stand on tiptoes, and crane one’s
neck, that is a clear violation of social norms. But can it really be
argued that the confession was not knowingly exposed? To use the
whisper analogy: What if you whisper your confession to a friend and
someone does not have to lean in to hear you? Can this doctrine really
rest on an evaluation of how far a passerby leaned in? Katz makes no
such distinction: in fact, one of the central pillars of Katz was to reject
such arbitrary distinctions, such as that between something being
attached to a wall versus inserted into a wall. 320 Nor is such a distinction
implied in the words “knowing[] expos[ure].”
Given the plain view roots of the test, a knowing risk of exposure
should be sufficient to trigger the third-party doctrine, without
complicating the matter by assessing how great the risk is. By instead
keeping the test as knowing exposure as an informed choice, and not
allowing it to be reduced to voluntariness—or even something less
than voluntariness—the reach of the third-party doctrine is
constrained in a way to avoid the problems articulated in Part II.
Under our test, the Smith Court could not assume the defendant
understood the inner workings of the phone company’s billing
practices, and the Miller Court could not force a person into a state of
voluntariness. At the same time, it allows police and reviewing courts
a simpler analysis, similar to the plain view doctrine. A court need only
ask: Did the information sharer (or would a reasonable person in that
position) know the risk that their information could be exposed? Not
only are courts familiar with the knowing standard, they would merely
need to examine publicly-accessible consumer terms of service and a
general understanding of a particular technology’s place in society to
utilize that familiar test.
Returning to making the “knowingly expose[]” element
substantive is the first key to fixing the third-party doctrine. If the state
shows that the defendant knowingly exposed the information, the
analysis then turns to step two.
2. To the Public
Katz knowingly exposed his conversation to the person on the
other end of the line, yet he retained his expectation of privacy. Simply
sharing information cannot be enough to trigger the third-party
doctrine, otherwise all conversations would be unprotected. An
analysis of the recipient—exactly who is “the public”—is the second

320

Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53.
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vital part of the inquiry. In Katz, the individual on the other end of the
line was not “the public.” The plain view doctrine analysis carries
through to this step as well, by asking: Can the information be accessed
by the government without compulsion or investigatory legerdemain?
If so, it is essentially in plain view, and “the public” has been exposed.
For instance, information shared to social media is shared with the
public: even with privacy settings activated, an individual posting to a
social media account is not simply having a private conversation but is
making the information potentially available to multiple parties. This
is not simply a question of numbers: a conversation between three
people can be protected. But by knowingly exposing a post to a forum
where the government or others can access it, even if nobody does, the
poster has effectively exposed it to the public.
One of the reasons why courts have applied a simpler, more
reductive third-party analysis is that the third-party doctrine has been
inappropriately combined with the false-friend doctrine. As discussed
in Part I, these doctrines are separate, and they inform each other.
Without knowing exposure to the public, a person retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information shared with a third party until or
unless that third party shares that information, at which point they
have proven themselves to be false. This is an important distinction,
because to conflate the two doctrines into the simple sharing rule
espoused in Miller and Smith assumes all friends are false and makes
“the public” into any third party. But, if you share information with a
true friend, as Katz did, the third-party doctrine should not be
triggered.
But what about information shared with a non-person?
Increasingly, information is shared with third-party entities in such a
way that no human ever interacts with the data. According to Smith,
that still triggers the third-party doctrine—the telephone operator no
longer needed to be a person for Mr. Smith to have shared the
numbers he dialed with the phone company. 321 But how can sharing
numbers with an automated telephone operating system equate to
knowing exposure to the public? Looking to expressive use theory in
copyright law sheds light on this problem. 322 Under expressive use
theory, inert use—like a web browser copying the information on a
website for cache purposes—does not trigger a copyright violation as
would an expressive use, such as copying a book in order to read it. 323
321 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979).
322 Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1607–
10 (2009) (distinguishing between protected expressive use and unprotected nonexpressive use in copyright law).
323 Id. at 1624–25; see also Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503 (2012) (exploring other applications of the concept).
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This distinction can also inform the third-party doctrine: if there is no
expressive interaction by a third party or entity, it is hard to argue that
information has been knowingly exposed to the public.
We can apply this concept to familiar digital applications: if you
ask Alexa a question, and the device gives you an answer, your
interaction with that inert device cannot constitute exposure to “the
public.” But change the facts slightly and it could constitute such exposure: it has been widely reported that Alexa records your voice for a
short period of time after the “wake word” is spoken. 324 If those
recordings are themselves transitory and inaccessible, then Alexa users
are still not talking to the public. But if Alexa records and stores all
such conversations, which are then accessible to the behemoth that is
Amazon, then you are not simply having a conversation with a machine
but rather you are sharing your conversation with a massive
corporation in storable form. But change the facts again: Amazon still
has all of your recordings, but it represents to its users that these
recordings are not stored in a form identifying an individual speaker
but are simply amassed for anonymous training of Alexa; then, once
again, speaking to your machine comes with an expectation that such
speech will not be overheard by “the public” in any identifiable way.
Change the facts again: in headline news, it is revealed that Amazon
does actually keep identification information, and in fact sells this
information to Facebook for advertising purposes—then once again,
the reasonable person knows that their conversations are effectively
potentially public. But without these additional facts, it is not possible
to say that talking to a machine is enough to constitute exposure “to
the public”—there has to be a ghost in that machine who can
meaningfully blab, and the reasonable person needs to know about it.
This is an important distinction, one that is easy to determine by
investigators using the same tools that courts use to analyze whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet, it is misunderstood by the current third-party doctrine.
D. The Fate of Miller and Smith and the Role of Contracts
Much has been said about the failings of Miller and Smith. 325 Yet,
currently, they remain good law, and a court formulating a new rule
would need to decide whether or not those cases could survive,
appropriately narrowed, or if they would need to be overturned.
Under our solution, it is likely that both would be overturned.
324 Josh Hendrickson, How Alexa Listens for Wake Words, HOW-TO GEEK (July 15, 2019),
https://www.howtogeek.com/427686/how-alexa-listens-for-wake-words/ [https://perma
.cc/8QV3-ZCQN].
325 See supra Part I.
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Miller fails on both prongs. A bank account is required to operate
in our modern world, 326 and exposure cannot be knowing if it is
shoehorned into an activity required by society. Further, it is hard to
argue that handing a deposit slip to a teller to be filed in your account
is exposure to the public, let alone now when the teller is no longer
even involved and a person can access their own account directly
online without dealing with any person. Mr. Miller’s person-to-person
interaction with the bank teller is far more analogous to Mr. Katz’s
protected conversation than information exposed to the plain view of
the public.
Smith similarly fails both prongs. First, as the dissent notes, use of
a phone is not something a person can avoid, 327 and while this may no
longer be true for landlines, it is even more so today for cell phones,
as the Court has recognized. 328 And, despite the roughshod analysis in
the majority opinion around the knowledge element, it is a leap to
suggest that phone owners are aware of all the ways in which phone
companies store and use their call information. The Court in Carpenter
made the same mistake, listing all the ways in which cell phone
companies store and share CSLI without addressing whether a
reasonable user would have ever known about CSLI in the first place,
let alone what companies do with that data. Smith fails on the second
prong as well, as Mr. Smith’s dialed numbers were shared only with an
automated operator service. They also were not exposed to the public
any more than when a person writes an email to a friend—i.e., has a
private digital conversation—and doing so using Gmail does not mean
that they have shared the information with the public.
Revitalizing Katz’s “knowing[] expos[ure] to the public” test
returns individual choice to the analysis. A key component to Katz’s
analysis is that Katz himself took steps to keep out unwanted listeners.
By “shut[ting] the door behind him, and pay[ing] the toll,” Katz
demonstrated his desire to maintain his reasonable expectation of
privacy. 329 By eliminating the categorical sharing rule, our solution
allows individuals, similarly, to contract around their privacy needs. As
users and third parties understand that shared information is no
longer unprotectable, people who care about privacy would be able to
choose platforms that offer better security. 330 Others can opt out of

326 Ciarabellini, supra note 226, at 138.
327 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
328 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
329 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
330 It is also true that while many people lack the sophistication to change their email
platforms, there are many different hosting companies, some of which differentiate
themselves by emphasizing their encryption services and privacy protection mechanisms.
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that greater protection for cheaper platforms that might sell their
information and so make it public. All parties could knowingly choose.
This works in application: for example, Snapchat sold itself on the
basis that its snaps self-destruct after being viewed—this created the
kind of expectation of privacy that made the third-party doctrine
inapplicable. However, once it is common knowledge that the snaps
do not in fact disappear and are accessible, then users who are
concerned with privacy may want to switch to another platform
because that broad knowledge renders the snaps no longer protected.
If Katz knew his conversations in the phone booth could be recorded
and stored by the phone company to help improve call quality, yet he
used the phone booth anyway, he would be hard-pressed to argue that
he diligently protected his reasonable expectation of privacy. Likewise,
if an Amazon rival created a home support device that did not record
or store any information, but it also did not learn from users’ speaking
styles and habits, that would be a choice people could make.
There are dangers to expanding privacy protection because that
protection extends to the criminally minded, who may make use of
Miller being overturned to develop new schemes to conduct whitecollar crime. But that is the nature of the security-privacy balance
being recalibrated: the Fourth Amendment protects the guilty as well
as the innocent from unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, we do
not necessarily need the third-party doctrine to solve this problem.
The fact that banks are heavily regulated would likely ensure that all
banks would not immediately become hostile to white-collar
investigators, and otherwise legislatures can provide further such
regulations to ensure that banks do not become miniature Cayman
Islands within the United States.
There are also potential negative consequences to changing the
third-party doctrine in a way to permit contracts to vary expectations
of privacy. Given the difficulty in detecting and investigating whitecollar crime, being able to access banking records without a warrant
can be particularly helpful. 331 Reorienting the third-party doctrine to
the knowing exposure to the public test could result in less equitable
financial institutions—if banks were no longer mandated to share
information with government investigators, it is likely that wealthier
people could pay for more security from banks that were willing to
operate less openly with the government. But the alternative is that
nobody has any privacy in their banking records.

See Stacy Fisher, 10 Best Free Email Accounts for 2021, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 5, 2021) https://
www.lifewire.com/best-free-email-accounts-1356641 [https://perma.cc/G3EN-P4RS].
331 See Applegate, supra note 277, at 194–98.
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A system based on true knowing, voluntary exposure would allow
people looking to deposit or invest money to have a clearer picture of
their rights so they could decide whether to pay for more privacy or
take the risk that their bank might be false. This is in line with Katz’s
subjective expectation of privacy inquiry: courts want people to show
that they have tried to keep their goods and information secure. That
is, Katz encouraged individuals to try to maintain their privacy through
their choice of actions. The knowing exposure to the public test
provides more clarity for citizens, institutions, government agents, and
reviewing courts. 332
E. The Practicality of a Katzian Solution for the New Roberts Court
The preceding analysis raises the question of whether a Katzian
solution to the third-party problem is likely to be adopted by the
contemporary Roberts Court. The Court’s new six-person conservative
majority 333 may seem a pragmatic stumbling block to our proposal.
However, this solid conservative majority does not translate to a solid
originalist majority, and it is originalism that constitutes the only
coherent viable alternative to our solution. The only other alternative
is to build on the rather incoherent existing patchwork of ill-justified
distinctions. 334 In this Section, we briefly describe why a structured
return to Katz is more likely, albeit constituted by an ideologically
motley collection of liberal justices and more moderate conservatives.
Katz was most vehemently criticized by Justice Scalia, who
attempted to replace Katzian reasonable expectation analysis with a
return to trespass analysis for addressing whether a search or seizure
has occurred. 335 He was unsuccessful in ousting Katz but, starting in
United States v. Jones, Justice Scalia was able to reanimate the trespass
doctrine as a co-equal partner of reasonable expectation analysis on
this question. 336 However, note that his success in that case was itself
332 This clarity is important because, since it was introduced, the subjective prong has
been acknowledged but never applied. As it stands, the subjective prong does no work.
But, by giving substance to the objective prong, our test provides the individual protections
envisioned by a subjective inquiry.
333 See, e.g., Jason Windett, Jeffrey J. Harden, Morgan L.W. Hazelton & Matthew E.K.
Hall, Amy Coney Barrett Is Conservative. New Data Shows Us How Conservative, WASH. POST (Oct.
22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/22/amy-coney-barrett-isone-most-conservative-appeals-court-justices-40-years-our-new-study-finds/
[perma.cc
/ZCA7-3FHT].
334 See supra Section III.A.
335 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“While it may be difficult to refine
Katz . . . there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”).
336 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment rights do
not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that
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based on an unstable ideological coalition: Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined the opinion, with the fifth vote
being supplied by Justice Sotomayor, who wrote separately to
emphasize that she had signed on to the originalist inquiry as an
additional means of protection against overly-intrusive searches. 337
Justice Scalia was replaced by the equally originalist-oriented
Justice Gorsuch, 338 who has also indicated his preference for trespass
over Katzian analysis. 339 In addition, Justice Thomas 340 and Justice
Barrett 341 are both strict originalists. But while some have tried to claim
that Justice Kavanaugh is an originalist, there is little evidence for
this. 342 At any rate, there are good reasons to believe that there can be
a five-justice majority for a return to Katzian analysis, with or without
Justice Kavanaugh.
Chief Justice Roberts has never been an originalist: he generally
favors a pragmatic conservatism that rejects formalism in favor of
functionalism. 343 This is evidenced by his having authored both major

degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.’” (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34)).
337 Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that “the trespassory test applied in
the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum” but “even in the
absence of a trespass, ‘a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.’” (quoting Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 33)).
338 Neil M. Gorsuch, Justice Neil Gorsuch: Why Originalism Is the Best Approach to the
Constitution, TIME (Sept. 6, 2019), https://time.com/5670400/justice-neil-gorsuch-whyoriginalism-is-the-best-approach-to-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/LXR9-6JMR].
339 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2244 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“That the Katz test departs so far from the text of the Fourth Amendment is reason enough
to reject it.”).
340 Justice Thomas is the most extreme originalist to have served on the Court, willing
to overturn any precedent he sees as conflicting with originalism, a position that Justice
Scalia differentiated himself from, saying “I’m an originalist and a textualist, not a nut.” See
Jeffrey Rosen, What Made Antonin Scalia Great, ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/what-made-antonin-scalia-great/462837/
[https://perma.cc/9MGB-9UUX] (quoting Scalia).
341 Amy Coney Barrett Senate Confirmation Hearing Day 3 Transcript, at 31:54, REV (Oct.
14, 2020), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/amy-coney-barrett-senate-confirmationhearing-day-3-transcript [https://perma.cc/Y4WK-VMA2] (“When I said Justice Scalia’s
philosophy is mine too, what I meant is that his jurisprudential approach to text as we’ve
talked about originalism and textualism is the same that I would take.”).
342 See, e.g., Eric Posner, Is Brett Kavanaugh an Originalist?, ERIC POSNER BLOG (Jul. 18,
2018),
http://ericposner.com/is-brett-kavanaugh-an-originalist/
[https://perma.cc
/LST2-58UY] (describing both critics and supporters as claiming Kavanaugh is an
originalist but finding “no evidence” for this and concluding Kavanaugh is a textualist and
not an originalist).
343 Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671, 1709–11 (2016) (mapping the Court in two dimensions,
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exceptions to Miller and Smith on pragmatic grounds that considered
the reality of the ubiquity of smartphones in everyday life. 344 Yet, both
exceptions were written as narrow carve-outs, suggesting that the Chief
Justice may be more attracted to the patchwork approach. 345 However,
there is reason to think the Chief Justice may favor a more structured
approach in future. In crafting these exceptions, Chief Justice Roberts
was attempting to hew a path that favored functionality over formality,
retaining foundational analysis based on precedent without entering a
potentially increasingly problematic quagmire. But in opting for
exceptions, the Chief Justice created a different problem for himself.
Most commentators agree that the Chief Justice is exceptionally
concerned with Court legitimacy, 346 and pressure to keep up public
appearances of impartiality has recently increased following numerous
proposals for court-packing to mitigate the perceived disparities
between the very conservative Court and the more moderate public. 347
By crafting exceptions to Smith and Miller for cell phones while
maintaining those highly intrusive rules for other privacy applications,
the Chief Justice left himself particularly vulnerable to critiques
pertaining to legitimacy.
Scholars have pointed out that the Chief Justice promotes Fourth
Amendment protections for people who resemble him, particularly
those who are rich, white, and tend not to be harassed by the police,
while showing little concern for privacy intrusions that mostly affect
poorer people of color and more traditionally harassed minorities. 348
ideological and methodological, and measuring Roberts as a pragmatist rather than
formalist).
344 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (modern cell phones “are now such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that they ought to be treated differently from
physical objects); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (reasoning that “cell phone location
information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,” and so the involvement
of “a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment
protection”).
345 See supra Section III.A.
346 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts Is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed, ATLANTIC
(July 14, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/john-roberts-justwho-supreme-court-needed/614053/ [https://perma.cc/SAT2-B8NQ] (describing key
Roberts votes in the 2019 term as driven by the need to protect the legitimacy of the Court).
347 See, e.g., Sam Gringlas, Asked About Court Packing, Biden Says He Will Convene
Commission to Study Reforms, NPR (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/22
/926607920/asked-about-court-packing-biden-says-he-will-convene-commission-to-studyreforms [https://perma.cc/5ZNT-7HSE].
348 See Franks, supra note 8, at 467–68 (stating that the Jones vehicle search “is clearly
the kind of violation the Justices could imagine themselves experiencing, whereas they may
have had a harder time contemplating the possibility of being an arrestee subjected to an
invasive strip search before being admitted into the general population of a jail,” as was
permitted in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012)); see also John W.
Whitehead, Strip-Searching America: Florence v. County of Burlington, HUFFPOST (June 4,
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Likewise, Justice Sotomayor has called out Court majorities for
ignoring the disparate impact that Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment rulings have on minorities traditionally targeted and
harassed by the police. 349 As such, there is good reason to think that
the Chief may feel pressure to embrace a more coherent approach to
search and seizure jurisprudence, even if a more structured Katzian
approach may not be his first choice.
Justice Alito is likewise disinclined to originalism. 350 In Jones, he
mocks Justice Scalia’s originalist trespass analysis of the attachment
and monitoring of a GPS device thus:
[I]t is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that
are analogous to what took place in this case. (Is it possible to
imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in
a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to
monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?) 351

Similarly, Justice Alito is on record as being equally suspicious of
maintaining the status quo with an ever-growing list of exceptions to
Smith and Miller. In Carpenter, the Chief justifies his incrementalist
approach by warning that “when considering new innovations . . . the
Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that we do not
‘embarrass the future.’”352 Justice Alito responds: “Although the
majority professes a desire not to ‘embarrass the future,’” that may
mean that instead
this Court will face the embarrassment of explaining in case after case that
the principles on which today’s decision rests are subject to all sorts of
qualifications and limitations that have not yet been discovered . . . [and]
inevitably end up “mak[ing] a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment.” 353

Accordingly, although Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito may
share little in common with Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in
2012, 11:12 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/supreme-court-strip-searches_b
_1401063 [https://perma.cc/D7S7-YE7C].
349 See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (“We must not pretend that
the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are ‘isolated.’ They are the
canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in
this atmosphere.”).
350 For instance, Justice Alito mockingly commented in a First Amendment case, “Well,
I think what Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison thought about video
games.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786
(2010) (No. 08-1448).
351 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 420 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
352 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc.
v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)).
353 Id. at 2260–61 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745
(1979)).
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terms of preferred outcomes in search and seizure cases, there is good
reason to think that there is a five-justice majority for finding a solution
to the problems of the third-party doctrine beyond stitching together
that Frankensteinian quilt of exceptions and carve-outs. Our proposal
is the most feasible, as well as the most jurisprudentially wellbuttressed, non-originalist solution available. Those five justices may
apply the approach differently, meaning our proposal does not
guarantee outcomes. But we are not arguing for particular outcomes,
rather for a coherent and well-grounded approach, and there are
potentially five votes for taking that route.
CONCLUSION: THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IN SHAPING RESPONSES TO
PANDEMICS AND OTHER CRISES
In the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic has claimed over
620,000 lives and strained the health care system to its breaking
point. 354 Nations around the world have tried a variety of measures to
slow the spread of the disease, some utilizing aggressive testing and
tracing regimes. 355 In the United States, the response has been statedriven, with a variety of approaches leading to mixed results; some
states have implemented strategies like contact tracing, 356 location
tracking, 357 and self-reporting and quarantining, which have been
shown to be successful at limiting the spread—and subsequent
damage—of the disease. 358 These responses raise serious concerns of
how to balance public health and individual privacy and are greatly
complicated by the third-party doctrine. These dilemmas are not
going to disappear even with broad distribution of the coronavirus
354 COVID Data Tracker, CDC (as of Aug. 26, 2020), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days [https://perma.cc/8X3C-HAK2].
355 Ian Bremmer, The Best Global Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 1 Year Later, TIME
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://time.com/5851633/best-global-responses-covid-19/ [https://
perma.cc/QG9U-GABC] (detailing the initial success of Taiwan, Singapore, Germany, and
New Zealand in large part due to aggressive testing and tracing regimes).
356 Frances Stead Sellers & Ben Guarino, Contact Tracing Is ‘Best’ Tool We Have Until
There’s a Vaccine, Health Experts Say, WASH. POST (June 14, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/contact-tracing-is-best-tool-we-have-until-theres-avaccine-say-health-experts/2020/06/13/94f42ffa-a73b-11ea-bb20-ebf0921f3bbd_story.html
[https://perma.cc/24UX-DBQ4].
357 Dave Muoio, Google Mobilizes Location Tracking Data to Help Public Health Experts
Monitor COVID-19 Spread, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.mobihealthnews
.com/news/google-mobilizes-location-tracking-data-help-public-health-experts-monitorcovid-19-spread [https://perma.cc/X5WN-KXUE].
358 See Christie Aschwanden, Contact Tracing, a Key Way to Slow COVID-19, Is Badly
Underused by the U.S., SCI. AM. (July 21, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article
/contact-tracing-a-key-way-to-slow-covid-19-is-badly-underused-by-the-u-s/ [https://perma
.cc/G78U-JLLY].
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vaccine—experts warn that due to “increased contact between humans
and wild animals and global transportation networks,” large-scale
infectious disease outbreaks are increasingly likely to arise again. 359 As
such, resolving the third-party doctrine is vital to ensuring that the
United States can effectively respond to this and likely future
pandemics. Likewise, it will affect responsiveness to other crises, such
as terrorism, climate change, and any challenges that require tracking
or other public cooperation.
Manual contact tracing, which is widely viewed as one of the most
important tools for combating the spread of COVID-19, has involved
tens of thousands of investigators calling the recently infected and
asking for sensitive information about their health and potential
contacts. 360 The investigators then must call those contacts and suggest
they self-quarantine. 361 If any of the contacts begin showing symptoms,
investigators must continue the process until there are no more new
cases. 362 Consensus has grown around the need for smart testing and
tracing based on digital tools and devices, but the process is limited by
people’s willingness to report, 363 which is understandably constrained
given the third-party doctrine deeming such highly personal
information “voluntarily” shared, and so left unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment, if they cooperate.
Tech companies like Apple and Google have partnered with state
and federal governments to create contact tracing apps, 364 track

359 Milana Boukhman Trounce & George P. Shultz, COVID-19 and Future Pandemics,
HOOVER INST. (July 30, 2020), https://www.hoover.org/research/covid-19-and-futurepandemics [perma.cc/8R4K-V3ZY]; Future Pandemics Likely to Be Deadlier and More Frequent,
Warns UN Panel, FRANCE24 (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.france24.com/en/environment
/20201030-future-pandemics-likely-to-be-deadlier-and-more-frequent-warns-un-panel
[perma.cc/BB5K-XTMT] (“Future pandemics will happen more often, kill more people
and wreak even worse damage to the global economy than Covid-19 . . . . [due to]
deforestation, agricultural expansion, wildlife trade and consumption—all of which put
humans in increasingly close contact with wild and farmed animals and the diseases they
harbour.”).
360 Mike Reicher, David Gutman & Ryan Blethen, Despite Army of Workers, Coronavirus
Contact Tracing in Washington State Is Challenging, SEATTLE TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/despite-army-of-newly-trainedworkers-challenges-with-coronavirus-contact-tracing-in-washington-state-remain/ [https://
perma.cc/4DFH-RRGL].
361 Id.
362 See id.
363 VI HART ET AL., EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS, OUTPACING THE VIRUS: DIGITAL
RESPONSE TO CONTAINING THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 WHILE MITIGATING PRIVACY RISKS 29
(2020).
364 See Mike Feibus, Are Coronavirus Contact Tracing Apps Doomed to Fail in America?, USA
TODAY (June 25, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2020/06/24
/apple-google-contact-tracing-apps-privacy/3253088001/ [https://perma.cc/V2SR-22FE].
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contacts through Bluetooth-enabled devices, 365 and track anonymized
location data on a larger scale to determine movement trends. 366
While the motivation may be benevolent, the risks are obvious. In an
attempt to show the difficulties in containment and the dangers of
ignoring social distancing requirements, mobile technology company
X-Mode fed cellular location data collected during spring break into
mapping platform Tectonix. 367 In a video released on Twitter, X-Mode
and Tectonix were able to map every active device from a single Florida
beach and track where those devices ended up. 368 This information is
typically anonymized, and the companies involved maintain that
privacy is a top concern, yet researchers have repeatedly shown that it
is possible to re-identify members of anonymized datasets with only a
handful of data points, such as gender, zip code, or date of birth. 369
The reliance on big data and tech companies to facilitate contact
tracing through smart device applications has significant implications
for the third-party doctrine. Traditionally, contact tracing information
was gathered manually and given voluntarily to a third party, which
clearly activates the third-party doctrine. 370 If such tracking was made
mandatory, for instance through a required phone app download
directed by the government, as was done in South Korea, 371 that would
run afoul of the resurgent trespass doctrine articulated in Jones. 372
What creates a murkier constitutional issue is the current situation,
where data is gathered, processed, and shared with the government by
third parties. Under the Court’s current post-Carpenter jurisprudence,
it can be argued that knowingly sharing information with another
reduces, but does not eliminate, constitutional privacy interests
365 HART ET AL., supra note 363, at 12–20.
366 Jason Murdock, Mobile Phone Location Data of Florida Beachgoers During Spring Break
Tracked to Show Potential Coronavirus Spread, NEWSWEEK (March 27, 2020), https://
www.newsweek.com/x-mode-tectonix-coronavirus-heat-map-tracking-mobile-data-covid-19spring-break-1494663 [https://perma.cc/P995-6GLL].
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 See Natasha Lomas, Researchers Spotlight the Lie of ‘Anonymous’ Data, TECHCRUNCH
(July 24, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/24/researchers-spotlight-the-lie-ofanonymous-data/ [https://perma.cc/2YX3-3GGWL] (showing that, outside of strict access
controls, no current tools can protect anonymized data from re-identification).
370 Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, LAWFARE (Apr.
7, 2020, 1:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/disease-surveillance-and-fourthamendment [https://perma.cc/Y2C5-ZHXH].
371 Aaron Holmes, South Korea Is Relying on Technology to Contain COVID-19, Including
Measures That Would Break Privacy Laws in the US—and So Far, It’s Working, BUS. INSIDER (May
2, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-south-korea-tech-contact-tracingtesting-fight-covid-19-2020-5#a-mandatory-government-run-smartphone-app-tracks-thelocation-of-all-new-arrivals-to-the-country-1 [perma.cc/SVH9-HAGL].
372 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).
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depending on the type of information, but that is far from a sure
winning argument because technically that ruling only applies to
historical cell phone location information. 373 Information that would
normally be outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment under the
third-party doctrine may now retain constitutional protection based on
its sensitive or revealing nature—but what constitutes adequately
sensitive or revealing information, and how broad the revelation needs
to be, is an inquiry that can vary from court to court and judge to
judge. 374
Under the current standard, a key factor in determining whether
the Fourth Amendment applies is the voluntariness of the sharing. Yet
this analysis, too, is woefully underutilized; according to the Court’s
reasoning in Smith, it is likely that merely owning a cell phone would
be enough to indicate knowledge. 375 But, as Justice Marshall queried
in dissent, if a piece of technology is necessary to function in society,
can its use convey a willingness to share information? 376 In Smith, the
majority said “yes”; in Carpenter, the majority seemingly said “no”—or
at least “not always.” This also begs the further question: Can it be
considered “knowing” if people do not truly understand what is being
gathered and how the information is being used, or if the prompted
explanations are vague or misleading? 377 This is precisely why the
Court in Katz expanded Fourth Amendment protections to cover
actions outside the home—because as technology changed, the ways
people conveyed information changed, and the privacy standards
protected by the Fourth Amendment needed to be adaptive to those
changes. 378
While people may support sacrificing their rights temporarily to
combat a global pandemic, 379 it is unlikely the majority of Americans
373 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
374 Id. at 2217; see supra Section III.A.
375 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979).
376 Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless a person is prepared to forgo use of
what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept
the risk of surveillance.”).
377 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller & Aaron Krolik, Your
Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacyapps.html [https://perma.cc/LD46-C5MM].
378 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“To read the Constitution more
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.”).
379 “There is often a general willingness on the part of the public to accept greater civil
liberties deprivations in the face of a specific threat . . . .” Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Daniel
Ryan Koslosky, Mission Creep in National Security Law, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 669, 671 (2012)
(analyzing how deference to the executive during times of crisis can lead to medium- and
long-term unintended consequences involving civil liberties).
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understand the potential post-COVID privacy risks. Under the thirdparty doctrine, it is unclear whether or not sharing information during
the pandemic means one loses one’s privacy rights in that information
forevermore. The government might use location information and
contact tracing during a pandemic, but once that information is given
over to government health officials, what is to stop government
investigators from using that same information to locate someone
during a criminal investigation, or monitor large-scale movements
during widespread public protesting? Police in Minneapolis are
already using “contact tracing for who [arrested protestors] are
associated with, [and] what platforms are they advocating for.” 380 And
while the Minneapolis police department was not referring to using
medical contact tracing as part of its investigations, 381 there is little
legal protection for that information once it is given to third parties.
Without a clearer standard for what kind of shared information is
and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement, it is left to third parties and the government to govern
their own actions and abide by suggestions offered by interest groups
and academics. 382 For-profit companies do not have a great track
record with this sort of self-governance. 383 Since 1999, Google’s privacy
policy has changed dramatically, often adding difficult-to-find clauses
that opt users in to dramatically increased third-party sharing
programs. 384 Google was also forced to pay a $22.5 million fine to the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for placing “tracking cookies” on
certain users’ computers despite assurances to the contrary. 385 And the
FTC fined Facebook $5 billion for using “deceptive disclosures and
settings” that “allowed the company to share users’ personal
information with third-party apps that were downloaded by the user’s

380 Alfred Ng, Contact Tracers Concerned Police Tracking Protestors Will Hurt COVID-19 Aid,
CNET (June 1, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/contact-tracers-concerned-policetracking-protesters-will-hurt-covid-19-aid/ [https://perma.cc/9AU2-C3DJ].
381 Id.
382 See, e.g., Jessica Davis, ACLU, Scientists Urge Privacy Focus for COVID-19 Tracing
Technology, HEALTHITSECURITY (Apr. 20, 2020), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/acluscientists-urge-privacy-focus-for-covid-19-tracing-technology
[https://perma.cc/458MU25X].
383 Valentino-DeVries et al., supra note 377 (describing how mapping the path of a
consumer from home to work could reveal a person’s preferences); see supra Part II.
384 Charlie Warzel & Ash Ngu, Opinion, Google’s 4,000-Word Privacy Policy Is a Secret
History of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2019/07/10/opinion/google-privacy-policy.html [https://perma.cc/TWS8-YA2B].
385 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC
Charges It Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser
(Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay225-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented [https://perma.cc/6FY3-782B].
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Facebook ‘friends.’”386 Since the information was gathered from apps
used by other people, many users were unaware their information was
being collected at all and did not take the necessary steps to opt out. 387
This only changed when European regulations required users opt in
to being tracked across apps and websites, and only under threat of
fines. 388
Further, as studies begin to show that other smart devices like
Apple Watches, Fitbits, and Oura Rings can potentially provide early
warnings for COVID-19 infections, it is increasingly unclear whether or
not this information can and should also be provided to the
government. 389 There is little doubt that contact tracing and quarantining would be far more effective if the government, through a Fitbit,
could tell whether a person was infected while they were still
asymptomatic, and thus at the greatest risk of spreading the disease. 390
But once the government has access to such location information,
associational contacts, and health information, it has little incentive
not to continue to use it and to provide that information to other
government agencies, including for the purposes of criminal
investigation. This phenomenon is known as “mission creep,” or in
this context, “surveillance creep”: when information gathered for one
legitimate purpose is used for another, less legitimate purpose.391
Mission creep is a valid fear. Information gathered by the NSA largely
for the purposes of national security from foreign threats was used by
a secretive U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration which funneled

386 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping
New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events
/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions
[https://perma.cc/3GXD-7Q7E].
387 Id.
388 What Does the GDPR Mean for Business and Consumer Technology Users, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/what-the-regulation-means-for-everyday-internet-user/ [https://perma.cc
/2DSQ-DV5E] (describing new rules prohibiting sending of marketing emails or collecting
personal information “unless you explicitly grant permission”).
389 Geoffrey A. Fowler, Wearable Tech Can Spot Coronavirus Symptoms Before You Even
Realize You’re Sick, WASH. POST (May 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/technology/2020/05/28/wearable-coronavirus-detect/
[https://perma.cc/2WGKHPR7].
390 See Anuja Vaidya, COVID-19 Patients Most Infectious Before, Right After Symptom Onset,
Study Finds, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (May 5, 2020), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com
/infection-control/covid-19-patients-most-infectious-before-right-after-symptom-onsetstudy-finds.html [https://perma.cc/P4V7-GQRE].
391 Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy, 87
B.U. L. REV. 347, 348–50 (2007) (describing that disease surveillance was originally created
at the end of the nineteenth century to contact, trace, and prevent contagious diseases like
smallpox, but today is largely used for “statistical analysis, planning, budgeting, and general
research”).
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“information from intelligence intercepts, wiretaps, informants and a
massive database of telephone records to authorities across the nation
to help them launch criminal investigations of Americans.” 392
As well as mission creep, we must consider potentially endless
missions. People might be more willing to provide access to private
information during the pandemic if access to such data and the
continuing gathering of it ends once the threat of COVID has passed.
However, access to such useful information makes the government
historically disinclined to give it up. For instance, the PATRIOT Act
was passed in 2001 to respond to the 9/11 attacks; 393 until 2020, that
legislation continued to blur the line between intelligence gathering
and criminal investigations in ways that now implicate domestic crime
wholly excluded from terrorist threats.
It is not uncommon for techniques and procedures to be
developed during a time of crisis and remain in place long after the
crisis has ended. Disease surveillance—of which contact tracing is a
type—began at the end of the nineteenth century as a way to track
smallpox. 394 Today, disease surveillance and compulsory reporting is
suggested for twenty-nine newborn genetic conditions, more than sixty
infectious diseases, and to track potentially contaminated food. 395 This
information now provides public health researchers with data
unburdened by consent and the rigors of an academic study. 396 The
income tax, first introduced in Great Britain in 1799, began as a
temporary war measure. 397 Similarly, daylight saving time originated
as a way to save fuel during World War I, yet it has slowly been extended
over the ensuing decades. 398 There are no structural limitations that
ensure the use of third-party data gathered during this emergency will
be limited to this emergency only. And the Court has only provided
an admittedly narrow type of third-party information that cannot be

392 John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs Agents to Cover Up Program
Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/usdea-sod/exclusive-u-s-directs-agents-to-cover-up-program-used-to-investigate-americansidUSBRE97409R20130805 [https://perma.cc/52WW-D8LH].
393 Baldwin & Koslosky, supra note 379, at 670–71.
394 Mariner, supra note 391, at 349.
395 Id. at 350; Report a Problem with Food, FOODSAFETY.GOV (Sept. 3, 2019), https://
www.foodsafety.gov/food-poisoning/report-problem-with-food [https://perma.cc/3DEZYAZN].
396 Mariner, supra note 391, at 350–51.
397 Income Tax, POLITICS.CO.UK, https://www.politics.co.uk/reference/income-tax
[https://perma.cc/P9WU-ZLRH].
398 Olivia B. Waxman, The Real Reason Why Daylight Saving Time Is a Thing, TIME (Nov.
1, 2017), https://time.com/4549397/daylight-saving-time-history-politics/ [https://perma
.cc/GHV9-VX9N].
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gathered without a warrant—how to fit other kinds of information into
this standard is unclear. 399
The Court’s categorical third-party doctrine rendered this type of
information unprotected long before COVID. The COVID crisis
merely accelerated the expansion of data already potentially available
to the government and the issues the third-party doctrine raises in
terms of government responsiveness go well beyond COVID. The
government had potential access to health data through Fitbit,
Garmin, and other health tracking devices; to images of a person’s
private property through front door cameras; and to internet call
transcripts through providers. 400 COVID simply illustrates the problem
of the third-party doctrine in stark, highly personal terms. But the
reverse problem is potentially even more severe: the third-party
doctrine’s stringency could hamper the ability of the U.S. to effectively
combat COVID and future crises by making people unwilling to share
their data, essential to tracking the spread of the disease, out of fear of
loss of privacy—a fear that is very much justified. And COVID is
actually likely to make the problem worse, as these two effects reinforce
each other.
Without a stronger, clearer rule of what information given to a
third party can be accessed by the government, a circularity problem
is created: the government starts tracking location information to
respond to COVID; that action is reasonable in light of the global
pandemic; the government begins to use that tracking information for
other health crises and natural disasters; it becomes commonplace and
its use reasonable, and expectations of privacy recede as a result. 401
Add to that a stringent rule that any information given to a third party
means we can skip even that circular analysis, and assume the
information is unprotected, then the Supreme Court might just be
creating a major stumbling block for solving the pandemic in the U.S.
Either, contrary to its assumptions, individuals do not understand the
significance of sharing their information with the government, and so
the presumptions of the third-party doctrine are wrong; or else, they
do understand, and are unlikely to be willing to make that sacrifice,
399 Rozenshtein, supra note 370 (“Unfortunately the court did not provide much
guidance on how to apply Carpenter’s reasoning to different fact patterns . . . .”).
400 See supra Part II.
401 Scholars and judges alike have recognized the circularity danger in Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test. See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of
Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188 (“[I]t is circular to say that there is
no invasion of privacy unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable
expectation of privacy; whether he will or will not have such an expectation will depend on
what the legal rule is.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 650 (2007) (“The government seemingly can deny privacy just by letting
people know in advance not to expect any.”).
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meaning that people will be less willing to provide information that
could actually stop this deadly disease. 402 The Supreme Court might
carve out one of its few exceptions, specifically curtailing application
of the third-party doctrine for COVID information, but that will come
too late to be useful in responding to this fast-changing pandemic and
will not answer the same conundrum as applied to future crises.
The COVID pandemic provides a stark illustration of just how
inappropriate the assumptions made by the Supreme Court are in the
third-party doctrine, and how inadequate it is to provide protection by
carving out narrow exceptions, years after state action has occurred.
But the problem has always been there since the Court made the thirdparty doctrine artificially categorical, ignoring the mandate of Katz to
actually examine the circumstances of each case, ascertaining whether
there truly is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Perhaps the breadth
of the governmental response required to combat the COVID
pandemic will inspire the Supreme Court to reform this problematic
doctrine. Our solution provides a roadmap for doing so in a way that
provides appropriate protection for private information while giving
third parties and the government the flexibility to deal with an
impending crisis. Under the correct reading of Katz’s third-party rule,
information is outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment when it is
“knowingly expose[d] to the public.” Those words need to be given
genuine meaning, not simply assumed to be met simply by the fact that
a person has given information to a third party, however unknowingly,
unwillingly, or inadvertently, and regardless of the role of that third
party.

402 A majority (58%) of U.S. adults say they would be “very or somewhat likely to speak
with a public health official who contacted them by phone or text message to speak with
them about the coronavirus outbreak” but a minority (49%) “say they would be similarly
comfortable sharing location data from their cellphone.” Colleen McClain & Lee Rainie,
The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/10/30/the-challenges-of-contact-tracing-asu-s-battles-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/L7FC-7ZK7].

